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Comments
Disclosing the Identities of Juvenile Felons:
Introducing Accountability to Juvenile Justice
When he wasn't stealing cars, he was throwing things at them or
setting them on fire. "What could you do? . . . Tell his
grandmother? She'd yell at him, and he'd be right back on the
street. If the police picked him up, they'd just bring him back
home because he was too young to lock up. He was
untouchable, and he knew that."'
I. INTRODUCTION
The above passage articulates the exasperation felt by many who
knew and feared eleven-year-old Robert Sandifer.2 In just a year and a
half, he compiled a rap sheet that contained twenty-three felonies and
five misdemeanors. 3 On August 28, 1994, apparently acting upon in-
structions from older members of his gang, 4 he fired a semi-automatic
weapon into a group of kids playing football and killed fourteen-year-
old Shavon White, who happened to be in the area.5 Shortly after the
shooting, according to the Chicago Police, fourteen-year-old Derrick
Hardaway and his sixteen-year-old brother Cragg, both members of
1. Nancy R. Gibbs, Murder in Miniature, TIME, Sept. 19, 1994, at 58 (quoting a
neighbor expressing his exasperation over the trouble caused by eleven-year-old Robert
Sandifer).
2. See, e.g., id. at 56, 58 (interviewing people who knew Sandifer). One twenty-
year-old woman remembered her eleven-year-old neighbor this way: "You really can't
describe how bad he really was. He'd curse you completely out. He broke in school,
took money, burned cars." Id. at 58.
Sandifer, however, did not terrorize everyone in his community. See id. (discussing
interviews of some of Sandifer's neighbors who had fond memories of him). One man
observed that "[it always meant trouble when he [Sandifer] was with a group .... If he
was alone, he was sweet as jelly." Id.
3. Id. at 58.
4. See id. at 56, 59. Gang researcher George Knox, who believes Sandifer was an
instrument "of revenge sparked by a drug feud or a personal insult," attaches the
following significance to the fact that Sandifer approached the group on foot: "If it was
just an initiation ceremony, he'd do it from a car. But to go right up to the victims, that
means he was trying to collect some points and get some rank or maybe a nice little cash
bonus." Id. at 59.
5. Id. at 59. In grief, Shavon's mother lamented, "Shavon never got a chance, never
got a chance." Id.
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Sandifer's gang, drove Sandifer to a railroad underpass, where he was
shot twice in the back of the head.6 Sandifer was indeed untouchable
to everyone except members of his own gang, who feared he would
inform the police who ordered him to fire the gun that killed Shavon
White.7
Robert Sandifer's mug shot, the only picture taken of him while he
was alive that his family could find, made the cover of Time maga-
zine.8 Perhaps the most poignant element of the tragedies surrounding
Robert Sandifer's life and death is that his story was reported, not as
an aberration, but as an emblem of the nation's affliction of juvenile
violence and the failure of the nation's juvenile courts to provide an
acceptable remedy. 9 In fact, stories like Sandifer's are fueling a move-
ment to reform radically the juvenile court system's approach to juve-
nile crime."0
The juvenile justice system began at the turn of the century," when
a group of dedicated and ambitious people 2 set out to provide an
6. ld. at 59.
7. Id. Police currently fear that the Hardaway brothers could themselves be in danger
if their gang believes they may tell the police who ordered them to kill Sandifer, since
gangs can easily order incarcerated members to kill fellow inmates. Id.
8. Id. at 54.
9. See, e.g., id. at 57. Cook County Circuit Judge Thomas Sumner noted, "I see a lot
of Roberts." Id. Cook County Public Guardian Patrick Murphy observed: "We see this
100 times a week." Id.
But the problem of juvenile violence is not limited to Chicago. The story following
Sandifer's cover story in Time mentions the Sandifer case as one of several examples of
the problem the entire nation faces. Richard Lacayo, When Kids Go Bad: America's
Juvenile-Justice System is Antiquated, Inadequate and No Longer Able to Cope with the
Violence Wrought by Children whom No One Would Call Innocents, TIME, Sept. 19,
1994, at 60, 61.
10. See, e.g., Lacayo, supra note 9, at 61 (quoting Los Angeles District Attorney Gil
Garcetti as saying: "We need to throw out our entire juvenile-justice system."); James A.
Fox & Glenn Pierce, American Killers Are Getting Younger, USA TODAY (magazine),
Jan. 1994, at 24, 26 (criticizing state legislatures for using publicized cases of juvenile
violence to justify reforming their juvenile court systems); Chris Pipho, States Get
Tough on Juvenile Crime, PHI DELTA KAPPAN, Dec. 1993, at 286, 287 (chronicling the
states' reaction to the rise in violent juvenile crime); Phil Sudo, What Kind of Justice?,
SCHOLASTIC UPDATE, Apr. 5, 1991, it 10, I1 (reporting the movement towards reforming
juvenile courts); Anastasia Toufexis, Our Violent Kids: A Rise in Brutal Crimes by the
Young Shakes the Soul of Society, TIME, June 12, 1989, at 52 (reporting that 88% of
Americans believe teenage violence is a bigger problem today than it was'in the past).
11. In 1899, Illinois became the first state to create a juvenile court system. In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14 (1967).
12. See, e.g., Edward J. McLaughlin & Lucia B. Whisenand, Jury Trial, Public Trial
and Free Press in Juvenile Proceedings: An Analysis and Comparison of the IJAIABA,
Task Force and NAC Standards, 46 BROOK. L. REV. I, 16 (1979) (describing' the early
reformers as "idealistic, yet simplistic"). -See also Orman W. Ketcham, The
Development of Juvenile Justice in the United States, in THE CHANGING FACES OF
1996] Disclosing the Identities of Juvenile Felons
alternative method of addressing the problem of juvenile crime.
Instead of exposing young offenders to the rigidities of the criminal
justice system 3 and the cruelties of criminal prisons,.4 the court sys-
tem devised by these early reformers 5 focused on meeting the special
needs of troubled children. 6 Determinism, 7 a philosophical concept
which posits that human action is the product of various environmen-
tal, biological, or social determinants rather than free will, heavily in-
fluenced the early reformers. 18 These reformers believed that juveniles
were not responsible for their actions, and therefore believed that the
young offenders should be rehabilitated rather than punished.' 9 The
early reformers included in their recipe for rehabilitation the preser-
vation of the anonymity of young lawbreakers.2 ° In order to provide
the children appearing before the juvenile courts with a chance to enjoy
productive and untroubled futures, the juvenile justice system had to
JUVENILE JUSTICE 9, 10 (V. Lorne Stewart ed., 1978) (explaining that the early reformers
in Illinois were made up of "affluent women . . . prominent lawyers and social workers").
13. See, e.g., Frederic L. Faust & Paul J. Brantingham, The Era of the "Socialized"
Juvenile Court-1899 to 1967, in JUVENILE JUSTICE PHILOSOPHY: READINGS, CASES &
COMMENTS 145-146 (Frederic L. Faust & Paul J. Brantingham eds., 1974) (explaining
the early proponents of the juvenile court system considered the constitutional con-
straints imposed on criminal courts as fetters upon their efforts to "personalize" juvenile
justice).
14. Gault, 387 U.S. at 15 (explaining that the early reformers were appalled by the
practice of placing children in adult prisons).
15. Throughout this Comment, the term "early reformers" will refer to the founders
and early proponents of the juvenile court system who reformed society's thinking
about juvenile crime.
1 6. See, e.g., Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 107 (1909)
(criticizing the practice of placing children in the criminal justice system because it did
not consider what was best for the child).
17. See WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 369 (1988) (defining
determinism as "[t]he doctrine that every event, act, and decision is the inevitable
consequence of antecedents that are independent of the human will."); see infra part
lI.A.I.b. for an explanation of how determinism played a large part in the formation of
the juvenile court system.
18. See, e.g., DAVID MATZA, DELINQUENCY AND DRIFT 5 (1964). Matza noted that the
determinism of the early reformers "rejected the view that man exercised freedom, was
possessed of reason, and was thus capable of choice." Id.
19. Id. at5,7.
20. See, e.g., Mack, supra note 16, at 109. Explaining the importance of preserving
the anonymity of the delinquent, Judge Mack wrote:
To get away from the notion that the child is to be dealt with as a criminal; to
save it from the brand of criminality, the brand that sticks to it for life; to take
it in hand and instead of first stigmatizing and then reforming it, to protect it
from the stigma,-this is the work which is now being accomplished by
dealing even with most of the delinquent children through the court that
represents the parens patriae power of the state ....
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protect these children from the punishing stigmas that society attaches
to those with troubled pasts.2'
The early reformers chose to transport their ideals into reality
through the vehicle of the parens patriae22 power of the state. They
believed the state, through its courts and social agencies, would fill the
parental void in the lives of its juvenile delinquents. 3 They believed
that the parens patriae power of the state could shield juveniles from
the stigmas of the community24 and lead their wayward young back to
the road of righteous living.25 As Judge Julian Mack wrote in 1909,
the juvenile court was to act as "a wise and merciful father handles his
own child whose errors are not discovered by the authorities. 26
Support for the juvenile justice system depends upon society's
belief that rehabilitating juveniles is in the best interest of both the com-
munity and the child.21 This belief can survive only as long as society
considers the juvenile court's efforts to rehabilitate successful. If
efforts to rehabilitate delinquents are unsuccessful, then a juvenile
justice system that refuses to punish delinquents is destined for public
obloquy, because society is left with unreformed lawbreakers who,
like Robert Sandifer, can threaten public safety without fear of punish-
ment.28 The acknowledged failure of the juvenile justice system's
2 1. Id.; see also Paul R. Kfoury, Confidentiality and the Juvenile Offender, 17 NEW
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 55, 56 (1991) (discussing the injurious effects
stigmas have on the self-image and attitude of the juvenile).
22. The literal translation of this phrase is "parent of the country." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990). But parens patriae usually refers to the unfettered
paternalism of the juvenile court, or the doctrine of thought the early reformers
developed to justify that paternalism. See, e.g., Gault, 387 U.S. at 16 (explaining that
the meaning of parens patriae, as it is used in juvenile court discussions, is "murky and
its historic credentials are of dubious relevance").
23. See Mack, supra note 16, at 109 (stating that intervention of the state is
necessary "because the child needs it, as evidenced by some of its acts, and because the
parent is either unwilling or unable to train the child properly").
24. See id. (noting that states in 1909 were beginning to use their parens patriae
power to protect delinquents from the damaging stigmas of criminality).
25. Id. at 122. Judge Mack proclaimed that "those [juveniles] who are treading the
downward path shall be halted and led back." Id.
26. Id. at 107.
27. See, e.g., Orman W. Ketcham, The Unfulfilled Promise of the American Juvenile
Court, in JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD 22, 38 (Margaret K. Rosenheim ed., 1962). "The
cornerstone of parens patriae is the concept that the interests of the state and the welfare
of the child are not in conflict but, in fact, coincide." Id. See also David C. Howard et
al., Publicity and Juvenile Court Proceedings, I I CLEARINGHOUSE REV., 203, 204 (1977)
(discussing how the "rehabilitative treatment of problem children contemplated by
juvenile court acts is intended to serve the welfare of both the child and society").
28. Ulysses Currie, Democrat Representative to the Maryland House of Delegates,
Close to Home: Reality Requires Tougher Responses to Juvenile Crime, WASH. POST,
Feb. 6, 1994, at C8 ("Many young offenders today are hard-core criminals who have
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efforts to turn delinquents into law-abiding citizens 9 has eroded faith
in the prospect of rehabilitation, and the violence perpetrated by the
system's failures has eroded the willingness of many to continue treat-
ing juvenile offenders as something other than criminals.3 °
Popular discontent with the juvenile courts' failure to punish the
delinquents they also fail to rehabilitate reflects a growing trend in
American society to hold individuals personally responsible for their
actions.3 ' Consequently, preserving juvenile confidentiality is becom-
ing unpopular because it frustrates society's increasing desire to hold
delinquents accountable.32
In response to the swelling criticism of the juvenile courts, some
states are beginning to expose the identities of their more serious juve-
nile offenders to society's stigmas. States like Missouri,33 Illinois,34
Louisiana, 35 New Jersey, 36 Idaho,37 Kansas, 3 and Colorado 39 have
passed laws which remove the protective cloak of confidentiality from
certain violent and serious juvenile offenders. These laws are products
of the brewing conflict between those who stress the good of the com-
munity and those who stress the good of the child. These states divide
their delinquents into two groups, those for whom they will continue
to exercise their powers as parens patriae, and those against whom
long arrest records for serious crimes by the time they are 18. And most of them know
that juvenile law tips the scales of justice in their favor.").
29. See, e.g., Gault, 387 U.S. at 20 n.26 (citing reports that reveal an alarmingly
high recidivist rate among juvenile offenders); McLaughlin & Whisenand, supra note
12, at 16 (claiming rehabilitation of juveniles may be a myth); Rorie Sherman, Juvenile
Judges Say: Time to Get Tough, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 8, 1994, at AI (reporting the results of
a poll which found that almost half of today's juvenile court judges "admit ... [the]
juvenile justice system is failing").
30. See, e.g., State of Illinois, 88th General Assembly, Senate Transcript, at 2 (May
13, 1994) (statement of Sen. Geo-Karis) [hereinafter Senate Transcript]. "People are
getting fed up with youngsters . . . getting by with murder, so to speak, 'cause [sic]
they're underage." Id.
3 1. See infra part IV.A.
32. See infra part IV.A.
33. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.321 (Vernon Supp. 1995), as amended by H.B. 174, 325,
& 326, 1995 Mo. Legis. Serv. 275-76 (Vernon).
34. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 705, § 405/1-8 (West Supp. 1995), as amended by Pub.
Act No. 89-198, § 30, 1995 Iil. Legis Serv. 2496-98 (West).
35. LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. § 412(l) (West 1995), as amended by S.B. 1412, 1995 La.
Sess. Law Serv. 1313 (West).
36. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-60 (West Supp. 1995), as amended by Assembly No.
1629, 1995 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 135 (West).
37. IDAHO CODE § 20-525(l) (Supp. 1995).
38. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1607 (Supp. 1994).
39. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §19-l-119(l)(b.5) (West Supp. 1994).
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they will exercise their powers as protector of the community.4
Today's juvenile courts resemble criminal courts more than they
resemble the early reformers' paternalistic vision.4' Preserving juve-
nile confidentiality is one of the last vestiges of that vision. As states
like those listed above42 proceed to rescind earlier promises to shield
juvenile delinquents from society's stigmas, they are introducing
accountability into the juvenile justice system.
This Comment first examines the rise and fall of the philosophy and
practices used to justify the maintenance of juvenile anonymity within
the early juvenile justice system.43 It next discusses the constitution-
ality of, and the political impetus behind, the recision of juvenile
confidentiality, while examining a sampling of approaches some states
have adopted.' This Comment then analyzes the political and practical
need for disclosing the identities of juvenile felons.45 Finally, this
Comment proposes a general direction for the movement to reform the
nation's juvenile justice system, and suggests a specific approach to
the issue of juvenile anonymity.'
II. BACKGROUND
The early reformers used several deterministic philosophies to
absolve juvenile delinquents from moral culpability. 47 Determinism,
therefore, allowed the juvenile justice system to push the age of
criminal liability back from seven or ten to sixteen or seventeen.48
Pushing the age of moral culpability to early adulthood justified the
practice of preserving juvenile confidentiality, because children who
are not responsible for their actions should not suffer from society's
stigmas.49 Determinism also gave the early reformers several clinical
diagnoses of delinquency, which they could utilize to approach juve-
40. For a further discussion of these laws, see infra parts III.C.3 and 11I.C.4.
41. See infra part I1.B.3.d.
42. See supra notes 33-39.
43. See infra part 11.
44. See infra part III.
45. See infra part IV.
46. See infra part V.
47. See infra part II.A.I.
48. See infra part Il.A.I.
49. See, e.g., ROBERT R. BELAIR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE
INFORMATION POLICY: PRIVACY AND JUVENILE JUSTICE RECORDS 12 (1982) (discussing the
belief that children "should not be punished for acts that they neither understand nor
intend"); Mack, supra note 16, at 109 (suggesting that society should endeavor to
protect juvenile delinquents from the stigma of criminality).
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nile crime similar to the way doctors approach diseases.50 This further
justified the practice of preserving juvenile confidentiality because,
according to the reformers, experiencing society's wrath would hinder
the child's chances of recovering from the disease of delinquency."'
The juvenile court system, acting as parens patriae, offered young
offenders a chance to escape the harshness of the adult criminal justice
system.52 But youths entering the juvenile justice system were forced
to exchange the guarantees of "due process and fairness" '53 provided in
the Constitution54 for the paternalistic solicitude and confidentiality
promised to them by the juvenile court.5 5 The founders and subse-
quent proponents of the juvenile court system argued that this ex-
change benefited the young offenders.56 When the Supreme Court
finally insisted that constitutional rights could not be traded,57 the
parens patriae power of the juvenile court, including the power to pre-
serve confidentiality, began to crumble.
A. The Origins of the Juvenile Court System
At the turn of the century, disgust over the treatment of young
criminals fueled the reform movement that established the American
juvenile justice system.58 The early reformers believed that placing
children among adult criminals was a cruel practice which extinguished
any hope the young offenders had to escape the criminal way of life.59
Recent advances in the sciences of sociology, psychology, and physi-
ology6° provided the early reformers with an almost boundless faith in
50. See infra part II.A.I.
51. See infra part II.A.1.
52. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1967).
53. Id. at 12 (quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553 (1966)).
54. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV §1 (providing the right of due process to anyone
facing a deprivation of life, liberty, or property at the hands of the federal or state
governments, respectively).
55. See Ketcham, supra note 27, at 25-26 (describing a compact between the state and
juveniles in which the former provides the latter protection in exchange for the
relinquishment of the latter's constitutional rights).
56. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 21 (discussing the claim that juveniles benefit from pro-
ceedings without due process).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 15-16.
59. Mack, supra note 16, at 106-07 (noting the belief that placing children in adult
prisons "criminalized" them); see also Dean Albert J. Harno, Proper Development and
Training of the Child, in THIRD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON PREVENTION OF JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY 25 (1934) (arguing that placing children in adult prisons educates them in
crime and vice).
60. See, e.g., NORMAN TUTT, CARE OR CUSTODY: COMMUNITY HOMES AND THE
TREATMENT OF DELINQUENCY 16-21 (1974) (setting forth etiological theories of
1996] 355
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the possibility of rehabilitation.6' This faith led to a belief in the power
of sincere solicitude to mold the malleable soul of every child.6 As a
result, the early reformers insisted that the state train "its bad boys so
as to make of them decent citizens. ' '63
1. Philosophical Origins
The cornerstone of the juvenile justice system is the belief that a
child who commits crimes is not a criminal. 64 To some degree, this
aphorism is nothing new. Three centuries before the birth of Christ,
Aristotle exempted from responsibility children who were too young to
make truly deliberate choices. 65 Even before the juvenile justice move-
ment, states recognized that children below a certain age66 should not
be held responsible for criminal acts because they are incapable of
forming criminal intent.6' There was, therefore, nothing revolutionary
in exempting children from criminal responsibility. The revolution
instead occurred when the juvenile justice movement used the emerg-
ing doctrines of child psychology and positivist criminology to claim
that every juvenile is incapable of forming criminal intent.68
delinquency in physiology, psychology, and sociology). For a definition of
"etiology," see infra note 139.
61. See, e.g., McLaughlin & Whisenand, supra note 12, at 16 n.102 (describing the
notions of the early reformers as "idealistic, yet simplistic").
62. Mack, supra note 16, at 120 (asserting that juveniles should be made to feel that
they are "the objects of [the state's] care and solicitude."). This belief in the power of
solicitude is reminiscent of the philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. See JEAN-
JACQUES ROUSSEAU, EMILE ON EDUCATION 91 (Allan Bloom trans., 1979) (discussing
how confronting the child with necessity of things rather than the ill-will of a
supervising adult will make the child "patient, steady, resigned, [and] calm, even when
he has not got what he wanted").
63. Mack, supra note 16, at 107.
64. See, e.g., Mack, supra note 16, at 111 (insisting "[c]are must ... be taken not to
provide for dealing with the child as a criminal").
65. ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 967-968 (Richard McKeon ed. & W.D. Ross
trans., 1941) (stating that children are not capable of choice); id. at 971 (stating that
choice is a "deliberate desire of things in our own power").
66. The age of accountability was usually seven or ten. See, e.g., Mack, supra note
16, at 106 (noting that states used to attach criminal responsibility to children as early
as the age of seven, and as late as the age of twelve if the child was mentally or morally
deficient).
67. See, e.g., THOMAS J. BERNARD, THE CYCLE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 160 (1992)
(noting that since "the dawn of time, age always has been a factor believed to influence
the ability to form criminal intent").
68. See id. (reporting that the juvenile court reform movement extended exemption
from criminal accountability to all juveniles).
The original Juvenile Court Act in Illinois covered children up to age sixteen. An Act
to Regulate the Treatment and Control of Dependent, Neglected, and Delinquent
Children, 1899 III. Laws 131 §1. The current act covers children until they reach age
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a. The Emergence of the Theory of Adolescence
Under the traditional theory of accountability, a child's responsi-
bility for his actions increases as his ability to make deliberate choices
matures.69 In the first half of the nineteenth century, Alexis de
Tocqueville observed that Americans encourage this maturation
process by gradually increasing the responsibilities and moral culpa-
bility of their children. 70 By placing criminal accountability on chil-
dren from seven to ten,7' the criminal law in this country reflected the
notion that children should become adults as soon as possible.72
To rebut the traditional linkage of a child's moral accountability with
the maturation of his deliberative faculties, philosophers like Jean-
Jacques Rousseau began arguing that childhood is a period of life that
is separate and distinct from adulthood.73 Rousseau insisted that
imposing adult standards on children is not only unnatural, but also
spoils the child's development.74
Although Rousseau laid the, foundation for the notion of adolescence
in the mid-eighteenth century, the United States did not recognize his
seventeen. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 705, § 405/5-3 (West 1992).
69. This is the logical extension of Aristotle's observations in supra note 65.
70. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 585 (J.P. Mayer ed., 1969),
stating:
[Als soon as the young American begins to approach man's estate, the reins of
filial obedience are daily slackened. Master of his thoughts, he soon becomes
responsible for his own behavior. In America there is in truth no adolescence.
At the close of boyhood he is a man and begins to trace out his own path.
Id. But see ROUSSEAU, supra note 62, at 90 (opining that "[niature wants children to be
children before being men").
71. Mack, supra note 16, at 106.
72. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 70, at 584-86. De Tocqueville attributes the
American desire to hasten a child's path to adulthood to the effects of the American
subscription to the principle of equality. Id. The maturation process, thus, is a
movement toward equal status with one's parents. Id. As the child develops his various
faculties, he grows into obtaining an "incontestable right" to exert his independence.
Id. The child's parents, out of a sense of duty, grant him more freedom, and the child
accepts this freedom with the responsibility that accompanies it. Id.
73. ROUSSEAU, supra note 62, at 90:
Nature wants children to be children before being men. If we want to pervert
this order, we shall produce precocious fruits which will be immature and
insipid and will not be long in rotting .... Childhood has its ways of seeing,
thinking, and feeling which are proper to it. Nothing is less sensible than to
want to substitute ours for theirs, and I would like as little to insist that a ten-
year-old be five feet tall as that he possess judgment.
Id. For a discussion of Rousseau's tremendous contributions to modern psychology,
education, and thought about children, see id. at 3-28 (Allan Bloom's introduction).
74. See id. at 91 (stating that treating children like adults teaches them to become
"dissemblers, fakers, and liars").
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ideas until the latter part of the nineteenth century. 75 At that time, G.
Stanley Hall and other child psychologists began to argue that chil-
dren, regardless of their specious maturity, were not masters of their
thoughts; nor were they responsible for their behavior until they
passed through their teenage years.76 Hall's theory of adolescence
provided a buffer between childhood and the assumption of adult re-
sponsibility,77 which the early reformers used to extend the age of
criminal responsibility beyond the traditional ages of seven or ten and
into the mid-teens.78
b. Applying the Determinism of Positivist Criminology to Juveniles
Much of the philosophy of the juvenile justice system relied on a
radical shift in the philosophy of crime.79  This nineteenth century
revolution in thought replaced the classical theory80 of criminology
75. See ROBERT M. MENNEL, THORNS & THISTLES: JUVENILE DELINQUENTS IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1825-1940, at 81 (1973) (crediting Granville Stanley Hall with laying the
foundation for the modern views of childhood, youth, and adolescence in the late
1800s).
76. Id. at 81-82.
77. See id. at 82 (describing adolescence as a period of "storm and stress" from which
one emerges mature and civilized). "The youth who go wrong are, in the vast majority of
cases, victims of circumstances or of immaturity, and deserving of both pity and hope."
Id. (quoting Hall). Hall's views of the injustice of the stigmas that society attaches on
its young offenders reflect the views of the early reformers: "[lI]gnorant and cruel public
opinion [condemns] all those who have once been detected on the wrong side of the
invisible and arbitrary line of rectitude." Id. (quoting Hall).
Some of the traditional American disregard of adolescence that de Tocqueville discusses
in note 70, supra, apparently survived into the early twentieth century. See Elliot Studt,
The Client's Image of the Juvenile Court, in JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD 200, 207 (Margaret
K. Rosenheim ed., 1962) (stating that the upper age limits of the juvenile court laws,
which were typically fourteen or sixteen, is a reflection of the early twentieth century's
disregard of adolescence as "a distinct developmental period").
78. An Act to Regulate the Treatment and Control of Dependent, Neglected, and
Delinquent Children, 1899 I11. Laws 131, § I (establishing the Act's upper age limit as
sixteen); see Mack, supra note 16, at 106 (noting states used to attach criminal
responsibility to children as early as the age of seven, and as late as the age of ten).
79. See Faust & Brantingham, supra note 13, at 4-5 (1974) (outlining the
contributions of the "intellectual revolution in criminological theory" to juvenile
justice philosophy).
80. The adjective "classical," when modifying issues concerning criminology, refers
to theories developed by Cesare Beccaria and others in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries. See, e.g., C. Ray Jeffery, Theoretical Structure of Crime Control,
in CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN (1971), reprinted in JUVENILE
JUSTICE PHILOSOPHY: READINGS, CASES & COMMENTS at 17 (Frederic L. Faust & Paul J.
Brantingham eds., 1974) (describing the classical theory of crime). Although there are
several similarities, the classical view of criminology does not refer to the view of crime
held by classical Greeks such as Plato and Aristotle. Since the differences between the
classical criminologists and the classical Greeks are not important for the purposes of
this Comment, the adjective "classical" will hereinafter refer to doctrines of morality
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with the positivist theory. 8' How each of these theories assigns ac-
countability for criminal conduct is at the heart of the significant differ-
ence between them. Simply put, the classical theory places blame on
the criminal,82 while the positivist theory places blame on determinants
that are beyond the criminal's control."
Applying determinism to juvenile crime, the early reformers posited
that children who commit crimes are not criminals because children are
incapable of voluntary acts." The three major determinants of criminal
action, according to the positivist theory, are (1) defects in the crimi-
nal's environment, (2) defects in his physical makeup, and (3) defects
in his psychological condition." Thus, determinism identifies the
causes of juvenile crime as defects or disorders in the juvenile's family
life,86 in the struggles of his social or economic class, 87 in his physical
8 1. E.g., id. (noting the replacement of the classical theory of deterrence with the
positive theory of rehabilitation).
82. Id. at 17, tbl. I (listing "[mioral blameworthiness" [sic] as an element of the
classical theory).
83. Positivist criminology is merely determinism applied to criminology. See, e.g.,
MATZA, supra note 18, at 5. "[Positive criminology] rejected the view that man
exercised freedom, was possessed of reason, and was thus capable of choice." Id.
Absolution for things beyond one's control is a very old idea. In THE NICOMACHEAN
ETHICS, for example, Aristotle writes that those who commit involuntary acts deserve
pardon, and sometimes even pity. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 65, at 964. Aristotle's
parochial definition of an involuntary act, however, excludes acts that are not the
product of pure compulsion or blameless ignorance. Id. The agent's ignorance cannot
be in any way the fault of the agent and the agent must feel pain and regret when he
learns the consequences of his actions. Id. at 966.
Whereas Aristotle believes few actions are beyond moral consequence because few are
truly involuntary, determinists believe that no action is of moral consequence because
no action is truly voluntary. For a more thorough exposition of the determinist theory,
see Brand Blanshard, The Case for Determinism, in DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM IN THE
AGE OF MODERN SCIENCE 3, 3-15 (Sidney Hook ed., 1958).
84. See WILLIAM HEALY & AUGUSTA F. BRONNER, NEW LIGHT ON DELINQUENCY AND ITS
TREATMENT 2 (1936) (applying determinism to delinquency and .concluding that
delinquency is "as much a response to inner drives and outer stimuli as any other kind of
conduct").
85. See Jeffery, supra note 80, at 14 (listing "physical, psychological, [and]
sociological determinism" as part of the positivist criminology) (citation omitted). The
fathers of the three major branches of determinist philosophies are Karl Marx
(sociology), Charles Darwin (physiology), and Sigmund Freud (psychology). Id.
86. See R.W. Fairchild, Adult Responsibility for Character Development, in THIRD
ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON DELINQUENCY PREVENTION 13 (Sam Ryerson ed., 1934) (holding
adults responsible for the character development of delinquents).
87. See Jeffery, supra note 80, at 14 (discussing those sociologists who, using the
class struggles theories of Karl Marx, attribute crime to those struggles); see also ALDEN
0. MILLER & LLOYD E. OHLIN, DELINQUENCY AND COMMUNITY 56-66 (1985) (discussing
the sociological determinants of juvenile recidivism).
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88 8condition, or in his psychological condition. 9 Since forces beyond
his control push the juvenile into delinquency, the juvenile's actions
carry no moral consequence.90 According to determinism, the delin-
quent, therefore, should not be punished.9' .
Determinism allowed the early reformers to absolve juveniles from
moral culpability. But more than this, determinism pointed to causes
of delinquency that the reformers could diagnose and treat the way
doctors diagnose and treat diseases.92 Whichever of the recognized
causes of the disease of delinquency a child possessed, the early
reformers believed they could cure it.93
Exciting new doctrines in sociology, psychology, and physiology
pointed to causes of juvenile crime, which the reformers believed they
88. See Jeffrey, supra note 80, at 14 (discussing those determinists who, using the
theories of Charles Darwin, attributed criminal activity to one's physical makeup); see
also C.R. Henderson, The Relation of Philanthropy to Social Order and Progress, in
JUVENILE JUSTICE PHILOSOPHY: READINGS, CASES AND COMMENTS 29-30 (Frederic L. Faust
and Paul J. Brantingham eds., 1974) (advocating using Darwin's principle of social
selection to segregate and deny parenthood to "pronounced degenerates" who are
predisposed to criminal activity).
89. See Jeffery, supra note 80, at 14 (discussing those who, using Sigmund Freud's
theories of behavior, attribute crime to one's psychological makeup); see also HEALY &
BRONNER, supra note 84, at 132 (considering delinquency a reaction to emotional
disturbances and discomforts).
90. MATZA, supra note 18, at 69 (noting that juveniles experience an "episodic
release" from the conventional constraints of morality).
91. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1967) (noting that the early reformers
insisted that the "idea of crime and punishment was to be abandoned"); BELAIR, supra
note 49, at 12 (discussing the belief that children "should not be punished for acts that
they neither understand nor intend").
92. See Harvey H. Baker, Procedure of the Boston Juvenile Court, in JUVENILE JUSTICE
PHILOSOPHY: READINGS, CASES & COMMENTS 177 (Frederic L. Faust and Paul J.
Brantingham eds., 1974) (discussing why juvenile court officials find it "helpful to
think of themselves as physicians in a dispensary"); see also Faust & Brantingham,
supra note 13, at 4-5 (listing "the medical analogy of diagnosis and treatment" as an
important element of juvenile justice philosophy contributed by positive criminology).
93. See Charles H. Cooley, "Nature Versus Nurture" In the Making of Social Careers,
23 PROC. OF NAT'L CONF. OF CHARITIES & CORRECTION 399-405 (1896), reprinted in
JUVENILE JUSTICE PHILOSOPHY: READINGS, CASES & COMMENTS 18, 24 (Frederic L. Faust
and Paul J. Brantingham eds., 1974). Discussing his belief in the possibility of solving
the physiological, social, and psychological causes of delinquent crime, Cooley writes:
The fittest must always survive; but the standard of fitness is largely in our
control. Any one [sic] familiar with poor-relief or its literature, can point out a
dozen places where this may be hopefully begun. At the same time we must
work upon the prevention of crime by the reform of social conditions. And,
finally, when an individual actually enters upon a criminal career, let us try to
catch him at a tender age, and subject him to a rational social discipline, such
as is already successful in enough cases to show that it might be greatly
extended.
Id. at 24.
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could cure.94 If children became delinquents because they belonged to
an oppressed economic or social class, then alleviating the effects of
that oppression would lead them back to more civil behavior. 95 If
children became delinquents because they reacted to sundry emotional
disturbances, as some early reformers believed, then psychoanalysis
would put an end to the delinquent behavior.96 Finally, if delinquency
was the product of a physiological defect, then advances in the medical
sciences might provide the answer.97
2. Characteristics of the Early Juvenile Court System
Early juvenile courts desired to rehabilitate wayward youth instead
of punishing them. This desire led the early reformers to create a
"peculiar system for juveniles, unknown to our law in any comparable
context. '9 8 The early reformers designed the juvenile court to answer
several questions about the juvenile beyond concerns of guilt or inno-
cence, such as "[what] is he, how has he become what he is, and what
had best be done in his interest and in the interest of the state to save
him from a downward career." 99 They envisioned a juvenile court
judge as ideally having the qualities of a good father, a brilliant psy-
chologist, and a dedicated social worker.'0°
94. See, e.g., TUTT, supra note 60, at 16-19 (setting forth etiological theories of
delinquency in physiology, psychology, and sociology).
9 5. See ALBERT K. COHEN, DELINQUENT Boys: THE CULTURE OF THE GANG 121 (1955)
(attributing delinquency to the fact that "certain children are denied status in the
respectable society because they cannot meet the criteria of the respectable status
system"); MARK D. JACOBS, SCREWING THE SYSTEM AND MAKING IT WORK 265 (1990)
(attributing part of delinquency to society's failure to achieve integration).
96. See HEALY & BRONNER, supra note 84, at 132 (considering delinquency "a
reaction to emotional disturbances and discomforts").
97. See Jeffery, supra note 80, at 14 (describing the contributions of Cesare
Lombroso and Charles Darwin to the notion that crime is the product of anomalies in the
physical makeup of the criminal).
98. Gault, 387 U.S. at 17.
99. Mack, supra note 16, at 119-120.
100. Id. at 119. Mack noted the following:
He must be a student of and deeply interested in the problems of philanthropy
and child life, as well as a lover of children. He must be able to understand the
boys' point of view and ideas of justice; he must be willing and patient enough
to search out the underlying causes of the trouble and to formulate the plan by
which, through the cooperation, ofttimes, of many agencies, the cure may be
effected.
Id.
See also Anthony Platt, The Rise of the Child-Saving Movement: A Study in Social
Policy and Correctional Reform, in THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL
NAD SOCIAL SCIENCE (1969), reprinted in JUVENILE JUSTICE PHILOSOPHY: READINGS, CASES
& COMMENTS 118, 131 (Frederic L. Faust and Paul J. Brantingham eds., 1974) (quoting
Miriam Van Waters, The Socialization of Juvenile Court Procedure, 12 J. CRIM. L. &
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The early reformers also believed that everything possible should be
done to make juvenile proceedings different from criminal trials.' 0'
The juvenile should feel that he is the "object of [the court's] care and
solicitude.' ' 02 The proceedings should take place without the impos-
ing trappings and solemnity that are found in criminal trials.1
0 3
Perhaps most importantly, the identity and records of the juvenile de-
fendant should remain confidential.'0 4 The juvenile court, therefore,
would shield the young offender from the punishing stigmas that
society would attach to him if it discovered what he had done.'0 5
Additionally, the juvenile proceeding also differed from criminal
trials because it could operate without regard to many of the rights
guaranteed in the Constitution.' °6 The reformers premised this denial
of constitutional rights on the assertion that the Constitution does not
apply when the court is acting as parens patriae, 0 since there is no ad-
versarial struggle attempting to deprive someone of life, liberty, or
property. 0 8 Procedural rights designed to protect the liberty of the
criminal defendant would only get in the way of the juvenile court's
efforts to seek what is best for the child.' °9
The early reformers believed that "the basic right of a juvenile is not
to liberty but to custody. ' "0 Hence children have no rights other than
CRIMINOLOGY, 61, 69 (1922)). The juvenile court is a "laboratory of human behavior,"
and its judges should be "experts with scientific training and specialists in the art of
human relations." Id. The judge should "get the whole truth about a child" as a
"physician searches for every detail that bears on the condition of a patient." Id.
101. Mack, supra note 16, at Ill ("Care must ... be taken not to provide for dealing
with the child as a criminal.").
102. Id. at 120.
103. Id. at 119-20 (suggesting that the juvenile court judge should be a fatherly figure
who will sit next to the child and occasionally put his arm around him when making a
point).
104. See, e.g., Kfoury, supra note 21, at 56 (discussing the injurious effects stigmas
have on the self-image and attitude of the juvenile as well as hampering their
"educational, social, [and] employment opportunities").
105. Mack, supra note 16, at 107.
106. See, e.g., Gault, 387 U.S. at 17.
107. See id. (noting that the early reformers believed the juvenile court should not
have to be "subject to the requirements which restrict the state when it seeks to deprive a
person of his liberty") (citation omitted).
108. Id. at 16; see also Commonwealth v. Fisher, 62 A. 198 (Pa. 1905) (holding
constitutional due process concerns should not apply to the Pennsylvania Juvenile
Court Act because issues of life, liberty, and property are not decided).
109. Gault, 387 U.S. at 21 (discussing the claim that juveniles benefit from keeping
due process out of their proceedings).
110. Curtis C. Shears, Legal Problems Peculiar to Children's Courts, 48 A.B.A. J.
719, 720 (1962). See also Miriam Van Waters. The Socialization of Juvenile Court
Procedure, 13 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 61 (1922), reprinted in JUVENILE JUSTICE
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those associated with custody."' This assertion represents the core of
the philosophy behind parens patriae. The right to custody entitles the
child to the care and solicitude that every parent should bestow upon
his children. Children become "delinquent" because their parents do
not provide this care and solicitude." 2 If the state is going to, fill this
parental void which renders juveniles "delinquent," then the state, like
every other good parent, must raise the child by considering what is in
his best interest." 3
B. Losing Faith
The early reformers built the juvenile justice system on three pillars
of faith: (1) faith in the power of science to identify and treat the causes
of juvenile crime; 14 (2) faith in their belief that every child is suffi-
ciently malleable to rehabilitate;" 5 and (3) faith in the state's parens
patriae power to produce a sincere interest in the welfare of the
child. 16 This faith prompted the early reformers to make very ambi-
tious promises regarding the juvenile justice system's ability to rehabil-
PHILOSOPHY: READINGS, CASES & COMMENTS 191 (Frederic L. Faust and Paul J.
Brantingham eds., 1974) (discussing the child's "primary right to shelter, protection
and proper guardianship").
I 1. Gault, 387 U.S. at 17. The basis for the belief that children are not entitled to
the same procedural rights as adults is a product of Rousseau's belief that children are
fundamentally different from adults. See ROUSSEAU, supra note 62, at 90 (noting the
importance of treating children differently from adults because "[c]hildhood has its
[own] ways of seeing, thinking, and feeling which are proper to it").
112. See ROUSSEAU, supra note 62, at 91; see also Monrad G. Paulsen, The
Delinquency, Neglect, & Dependency Jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court, in JUSTICE FOR
THE CHILD 44, 73 (Margaret K. Rosenheim ed., 1962) (reporting the commonly held
belief among juvenile justice proponents that "the neglected child is the delinquent child
who has not been caught").
113. See Mack, supra note 16, at 120 (asserting that a juvenile court should ensure
that delinquents feel they are the objects of its care and solicitude).
114. See Faust & Brantingham, supra note 13, at 148-49 (describing the early
juvenile justice system as a "social-legal experiment based upon the (unwarranted) [sic]
assumption that scientific knowledge concerning human behavior had, in fact, reached a
level that would permit accurate predictions about future consequences of alternative
courses of intervention in the lives of children"); see also MATZA, supra note 18, at 10
(noting that determinism in the social sciences "has never been based on anything but
sheer faith").
115. See Dr. James P. Malloy, The Correction of Delinquency, in THIRD ANNUAL
CONFERENCE ON PREVENTION OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 28 (Sam Ryerson Jr., ed., 1934)
(discussing the belief that the young offender "may still be relatively plastic").
116. See, e.g., Mack, supra note 16, at 120 ("The child who must be brought into
[the juvenile] court should ... be made to know that he is face to face with the power of
the state, but he should at the same time, and more emphatically, be made to feel that he
is the object of its care and solicitude." ).
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itate each individual juvenile offender" 7 and to decrease significantly
the problem of juvenile delinquency as a whole."'
Supporters have recognized the juvenile court system's failure to
fulfill its promises throughout its history. Early recognition of the
disparity between the promises and practice of the juvenile courts
precipitated calls for reform of the practice, but not for a reworking of
the promises.119 Although the officials of the juvenile court system
consistently recognized the need to improve their efforts, their faith
was not seriously challenged until after World War II.12 It was at this
time that the system's failure to rehabilitate a large number of the delin-
quents precipitated sharp criticism of the juvenile courts.'2'
1. The First Pillar: The Power of Science
Faith in the power of science to diagnose and cure the causes of
juvenile crime fueled the early reformers' tremendous optimism
regarding the ultimate success of their efforts.'22 Frequently analo-
117. See, e.g., id. at 122. "Those [juveniles] who are on the downward path shall be
halted and led back." Id.
118. See, e.g., GEORGE W. WITHEY, ILLINOIS' SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON
DELINQUENCY 12 (1948) (claiming that juvenile delinquency could be eliminated as a
major community problem with the proper amount of community-based dedication).
119. As early as 1911, officials in the Illinois juvenile court system recognized the
need to reform the juvenile justice system. REPORT OF A COMMITTEE APPOINTED UNDER
RESOLUTION OF THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF COOK COUNTY, THE JUVENILE COURT OF
COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS 46 (1911) (proclaiming the "time is ripe for constructive reform"
in the method of disposition of juveniles). In 1934, a speaker at Illinois' Third Annual
Conference On Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency recognized that "[w]hile it cannot be
said . . . that we have overcome the difficulties involved, the methods now followed in
the treatment of delinquents, when we judge them by their results, offer evidence to
convince us that we are now on the right track." Harno, supra note 59, at 24, 26.
Another speaker at this conference admitted that the movement was still in the "pioneer
stages in the field of correction or prevention of juvenile delinquency." Malloy, supra
note 115, at 28, 29. See Charles R. Shireman, Foreword to JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD v, vi
(Margaret K. Rosenheim ed., 1962) (questioning whether the resources necessary to
fulfill the lofty goals of the juvenile court movement can be provided).
120. Ketcham, supra note 12, at 15 (characterizing the years after World War II as a
period of disillusionment concerning the juvenile justice system).
121. See id.
122. See Faust & Brantingham, supra note 13, at 145-46; see also Ketcham, supra
note 12, at 14 (listing "unerring faith in the efficacy of social science" as one of the
slogans of the early reform movement).
Positing an extremist view of the role of science in dealing with children,
psychologist Augusta Bronner in 1925 "urged that juvenile courts be allowed to remove
children from 'unworthy or stupid' parents who did not understand the principles of child
psychology." Robert M. Mennel, Origins of the Juvenile Court: Changing
Perspectives on the Legal Rights of Juvenile Delinquents, in CRIME & DELINQUENCY 68-
78 (1972), reprinted in JUVENILE JUSTICE PHILOSOPHY: READINGS, CASES & COMMENTS 52,
64 (Frederic L. Faust & Paul J. Brantingham, eds., 1974) (citing Augusta F. Bronner, The
1996] Disclosing the Identities of Juvenile Felons
gizing their efforts to those of a medical doctor, 123 proponents of the
early reform movement believed juvenile court judges should be child
experts with scientific training. 1
24
Despite the disappointing results of their scientific efforts to treat
juvenile delinquency, the early reformers and proponents of the juve-
nile justice movement retained their faith in the power of science to
solve the problem.' 25 In the late 1940s, as criticism of the potential of
science as a solution to delinquency grew, proponents of the scientific
approach tried to rekindle the early optimism that their faith in science
engendered. 126 They blamed the inadequacy of the states' efforts,
while refuting any suggestion of a deficiency in their philosophy, for
the failure of the juvenile court system to rehabilitate juvenile delin-
quents. 27 For those concerned with juvenile delinquency, faith in the
power of science persisted into the 1960s.128
It was in the late 1950s and early 1960s, however, that a debate
over determinism 129 suggested the limits of science's power to provide
Contribution of Science to a Program for Treatment of Juvenile Delinquency, in THE
CHILD, THE CLINIC AND THE COURT, 84 (Julia Lathrop et al. eds., 1925)).
123. Van Waters, supra note 110, at 191. "Analogy . . . brings the [juvenile] court
close to the spirit of the clinic." Id.; see, e.g., Baker, supra note 92, at 184 (describing
why juvenile court personnel must remember that their institution is "a remedial agency,
like a hospital" that must discover and cure what is wrong with each delinquent).
124. Van Waters, supra note 110, at 196.
125. In 1926, William Healy and Augusta F. Bronner described the current procedure
for dealing with delinquency as "unplanful and almost chaotic." WILLIAM HEALY &
AUGUSTA F. BRONNER, DELINQUENTS AND CRIMINALS 225 (1969). Things had not
apparently improved much by 1936. HEALY & BRONNER, supra note 84, at I (concluding
that "[s]ince the results of dealing with the [juvenile] offender are so frequently
disappointing, it must be that the basic forces producing delinquency and the obstacles
to treatment have not been sufficiently considered and made clear").
126. George W. Withey speaking at Illinois' Seventeenth Annual Conference on
Delinquency Prevention argued eloquently for a revival of the old faith:
We must keep a sense of poise and serenity, confident in the faith that is ours.
When an epidemic of preventable disease sweeps our State ... let us not cry
that scientific medicine has failed. If we are wise, we will say we have failed
scientific medicine, skirted its support, neglected its admonitions; let us
return to it with new intelligence and new loyalty, for it alone can save us.
WITHEY, supra note 118, at 13.
127. Id. "Today the great truth that the common people have the know-how to
influence human behavior has not failed, but we have failed its principles." Id.
128. See, e.g., Ketcham, supra note 27, at 22, 38-39 (calling for behavioral
scientists to develop procedures for assessing the needs of children).
129. For a discussion of the role determinism played in the formation of the juvenile
justice philosophy, see supra part II.A.I. For a collection of essays dedicated to the
debate over determinism, see generally, DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF
MODERN SCIENCE (Sidney Hook ed., 1958).
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solutions to delinquency. 30 The early reformers used determinism to
draw an image of the juvenile delinquent as someone who, because he
was merely responding to the irresistible demands of his biological,
psychiatric, or-social condition, should not be punished. 131 By the late
1950s, intellectuals criticized determinism because it left no room for
morality or punishment.' 32 As a result of this criticism, traditional
determinism, which denied the existence of free will, became known
as "hard determinism."' 133 At the same time, a new brand of determin-
ism emerged, "soft determinism," which recognized the free operation
of the human will as a sporadic cause of human action. 134 Soft deter-
minism quickly became more popular than the traditional hard
determinism.' 35
The shakeup in determinist philosophy and social science
reintroduced issues of morality and personal responsibility into discus-
sions of juvenile crime. 36 In 1964, David Matza wrote Delinquency
and Drift, 37 using soft determinism to put forth the theory that
delinquents "are neither wholly free nor completely constrained but fall
somewhere between."'' 38 As child advocates and juvenile court sup-
porters began to incorporate the doctrine of soft determinism into their
etiological 39 views of juvenile crime, their faith in their ability to cure
delinquency scientifically began to wane, for how does one cure the
disease of volition?' 40
130. See infra notes 141-44.
131. See supra part II.A.1.
132. See, e.g., Blanshard, supra note 83, at 10 (addressing the argument that
determinism "makes a mess of morality").
133. For a discussion of the split between hard and soft determinism, see generally
Paul Edwards, Hard And Soft Determinism, in DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF
MODERN SCIENCE 104-13 (Sidney Hook ed., 1958).
134. For a discussion of the properties of soft determinism, see generally id. See
also MATZA, supra note 18, at 7. Summarizing the soft determinist view of modern
social science, David Matza wrote, "[mien vacillate between choice and constraint." Id.
135. See Edwards, supra note 133, at 105 (discussing the contemporary trend towards
subscription of soft over hard determinism); see also MATZA, supra note 18, at 7
(recognizing a shift to softer determinism).
136. See, e.g., MATZA, supra note 18, at 188-91 (discussing the moral significance
of juvenile crime).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 27.
139. Etiology is the study of causes. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 481 (2d ed.
1972). Commentators on juvenile justice often employ some form of the word
"etiology" to discuss various theories of the causes of juvenile crime. See, e.g., Charles
H. Shireman, Perspectives on Juvenile Probation, in PURSUING JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD
138, 145 (Margaret K. Rosenheim ed., 1976) (discussing various etiologies of juvenile
crime).
140. For a discussion of how determinism made scientific explanations of juvenile
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By the 1970s proponents of the juvenile court system openly
recognized the limits of science. More than seventy years of scientific
inquiry into the problem of juvenile delinquency produced a multitude
of mutually exclusive etiological theories. 4 ' Concentrating on
etiology over practice, most of these theories did little to suggest how
to deal with the delinquent.'42 Contrary to the unfettered optimism of
the early reformers, 143 proponents of the juvenile justice system during
the last twenty years have considered behavioral, social and medical
science to be merely tools useful for defining the modest goals, tasks
and methods of their programs.'"
2. The Second Pillar: The Power to Rehabilitate
Faith in the power to rehabilitate young offenders has always been
the central pillar of the juvenile justice movement. 45  This faith
presented an alternative to the practice of punishing delinquents like
adults: because we can rehabilitate young offenders, we do not have
to punish them.' 46 This faith justified ignoring the procedural rights
afforded adult criminals: because we are rehabilitating and not punish-
ing young offenders, we are furthering rather than threatening their
rights. 47 Furthermore, this faith in the power to rehabilitate precipi-
crime possible, see supra part ll.A.I.b.
141. See Shireman, supra note 139, at 145.
142. Id.
143. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
144. Shireman, supra note 139, at 145.
145. See, e.g., Mack, supra note 16, at 107 (asserting in 1909, that the juvenile
court should reform and uplift juveniles rather than punish and degrade them); Marcia S.
Greene, A Failing System: Nearly 75% Return to Streets, Crime, WASH. POST, Jan. 24,
1993, at All (quoting a Washington, D.C. Youth Services administrator who stresses
the need for the juvenile court to meet "the emotional needs [delinquents] missed as
children").
146. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1967) ("The child was to be 'treated'
and 'rehabilitated' and the procedures, from apprehension through institutionalization,
were to be 'clinical' rather than punitive.").
Faith in their power to rehabilitate young offenders even led at least one proponent of
the juvenile justice system to predict the replacement of punishment with rehabilitation
in the adult criminal justice system. See Gustav L. Schramm, The Juvenile Court Idea, 13
FED PROBATION 19 (1949), reprinted in JUVENILE JUSTICE PHILOSOPHY: READINGS, CASES
AND COMMENTS 196, 205 (Frederic L. Faust & Paul J. Brantingham eds., (1974))
(predicting that the extension of the "juvenile court idea of personalizing justice" into
the adult criminal justice system is inevitable).
147. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Fisher, 62 A. 198 (Pa.
1905), provided a strong defense of the lack of procedural rights in Pennsylvania's
Juvenile Court:
To save a child from becoming a criminal... the Legislature surely may
provide for the salvation of such a child, if its parents or guardian be unable or
unwilling to do so, by bringing it into one of the courts of the state without
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tated the belief that the efforts of the juvenile court were in the best
interest of the community as well as the child: successful rehabilitation
eliminates any threat the juvenile poses to the community and saves the
wayward child from a life of crime. 4 8 Finally, this faith demanded
the maintenance of strict confidentiality: the stigmas that society
attaches to its lawbreakers thwarts the process of rehabilitation.49
In 1920, only seven states prohibited the disclosure of juvenile court
records.' 50 While many of the early juvenile court acts did not
explicitly protect the anonymity of delinquents, however, the practice
of preserving juvenile delinquents' confidentiality grew out of the
juvenile justice ,system's emphasis on rehabilitation. 5' The early days
of the juvenile justice reform system established the connection
between juvenile confidentiality and rehabilitation.15 2
Although protecting delinquents from society's punishing stigmas
was the goal of preserving juvenile court confidentiality,'5 3 the juvenile
justice system's failure to rehabilitate delinquents has undercut the
reasons for shielding those delinquents from stigmas. If the juvenile
any process at all, for the purpose of subjecting it to the state's guardianship
and protection.
Id. at 200.
148. See, e.g., Ketcham, supra note 27, at 22, 38. "The cornerstone of parens patriae
is the concept that the interests of the state and the welfare of the child are not in
conflict but, in fact, coincide." Id. See also, Howard, supra note 27, at 203, 204
(discussing how the "rehabilitative treatment of problem children contemplated by
juvenile court acts is intended to serve the welfare of both the child and society"); Ex
parte Sharp, 96 P. 563, 564 (Idaho 1908) (holding that the purpose of the juvenile court
is to "confer a benefit both upon the child and the community").
149. See MENNEL, supra note 75, at 82 (quoting G. Stanley Hall). 'The youth who go
wrong are, in the vast majority of cases, victims of circumstances or of immaturity, and
deserving of both pity and hope." Id. (quoting Hall). Hall's views of the injustice of the
stigmas that society attaches on its young offenders reflect the views of the early
reformers: "[l]gnorant and cruel public opinion [condemn] all those who have once been
detected on the wrong side of the invisible and arbitrary line of rectitude." Id. (quoting
Hall). See also Kfoury supra note 21, at 56 (discussing the injurious effects stigmas
have to the self-image and attitude of the juvenile).
150. Gilbert Geis, Publicity and Juvenile Court Proceedings, 30 ROCKY MTN. L. REV.
101, 116 (1958).
1 5 1. BELAIR, supra note 49, at 14.
152. See, e.g., Mack, supra note 16, at 109:
To get away from the notion that the child is to be dealt with as a criminal; to
save it from the brand of criminality, the brand that sticks to it for life; to take
it in hand and instead of first stigmatizing and then reforming it, to protect it
from stigma,-[sic] this is the work which is now being accomplished by
dealing even with the most delinquent children through the court that
represents the parens patriae power of the state ....
Id.
153. See, e.g., id.
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courts are not rehabilitating delinquents, then protecting their identities
prevents society from learning the identities of those juveniles who
threaten public safety.'54 The frequency and vehemence of this posi-
tion grows as concern for juvenile crime increases, causing even some
juvenile court proponents to call for the rescission of the promise of
confidentiality.'
3. The Third Pillar: The State As Parens Patriae
The early reformers chose the parens patriae power of the state as
the vehicle for rehabilitating young offenders. 5 6 By invoking the
parens patriae power of the state, the early reformers placed faith in the
state's ability and willingness to fill the parental void in the lives of
delinquents.157 Thus, the state's "care and solicitude"'5 18 for its way-
ward youth would be sufficient to protect the delinquents' rights.'59
154. An early positer of this argument was J. Edgar Hoover, who in 1957 wrote:
"Local police and citizens have a right to know the identities of the potential threats to
public order within their communities." Geis, supra note 150, at 120 (quoting J. Edgar
Hoover).
155. See BELAIR, supra note 49, at 18. In 1977, Juvenile Court Judge James J.
Delaney argued that "minors who commit crimes forfeit their right to anonymity":
When a juvenile steals an automobile and wrecks it, does he still have the
same right to privacy as another who does not offend ... [W]e must address
the issue of juvenile records and confidentiality with reason. There must be a
balancing of rights and obligations, on the part of both the juvenile and
society.
Id. (quoting Judge James J. Delaney, Juvenile Records and Confidentiality 5 (1977))
(unpublished monograph).
In 1982, Juvenile Law Professor Martin Guggenheim asserted that the theory behind
preserving confidentiality does not apply to the more hardened criminals among today's
delinquents. Id. (quoting an unspecified interview with Professor Guggenheim). He
further asserted: "[w]e should eliminate Uuvenile court] confidentiality ... It has been a
protection for terrible abuses." Id. (quoting an unspecified interview with Professor
Guggenheim).
156. See, e.g., Mack, supra note 16, at 109 (listing the things the juvenile courts are
accomplishing through the parens patriae power of the state).
157. See, e.g., An Act to Regulate the Treatment and Control of Dependent,
Neglected, and Delinquent Children, 1899 Ill. Laws 137, § 21 (stating its purpose is to
ensure that "the care, custody and discipline of a child shall approximate as nearly as
may be that which should be given by its parents"). See also Commonwealth v. Fisher,
62 A. 198, 201 (Pa. 1905). "Every statute which is designed to give protection, care,
and training to children, as a needed substitute for parental authority and performance of
parental duty, is but a recognition of the duty of the state, as the legitimate guardian and
protector of children where other guardianship fails." Id.
158. Mack, supra note 16, at 120.
159. See Fisher, 62 A. at 201 (holding that since the power granted the courts
through Pennsylvania's Juvenile Court Act was designed to be parental in nature there
"is no probability, in the proper administration of the law, of the child's liberty being
unduly invaded"). But cf. MENNEL, supra note 75, at 131-32 (discussing how the equity
characteristics of the juvenile court allowed the reformers to obviate concerns for the
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Although the first juvenile court system in this country was established
in 1899,' 60 the Supreme Court did not remedy the exclusion of many
constitutional guarantees from the juvenile court until the late 1960s.' 6'
The Supreme Court recognized that the promises of "care and solici-
tude," made by the state acting as parens patriae, 62 were no substitute
for the rights guaranteed in the Constitution. 63
Belief in the need to preserve the confidentiality of juvenile court
proceedings depended on the faith one had in the court's ability to
fulfill the promises of parens patriae. If the court could not fulfill these
paternalistic promises, then the practice of confidentiality did little
more than conceal the juvenile justice system's failures and abuses.' 64
Thus, much of the issue rested on just how well the state could fill the
parental void in the lives of its juvenile delinquents.
a. The State Filling The Parental Void
The early reformers possessed an unfettered faith in the state's
ability to become a substitute parent for delinquent children.165 They
believed a fatherly juvenile court judge' 66 would conduct proceedings
that resembled father to son talks, 167 and would send the worst young
offenders to reformatories where "human love, supplemented by
constitutional rights of juveniles).
160. Mack, supra note 16, at 107.
161. See McLaughlin & Whisenand, supra note 12, at 7 (chronicling the Supreme
Court's holdings regarding juvenile courts).
162. Mack, supra note 16, at 120.
163. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1967) ("Failure to observe the fundamental
requirements of due process has resulted in instances, which might have been avoided, of
unfairness to individuals and inadequate or inaccurate findings of fact and unfortunate
prescriptions of remedy.").
164. See MATZA, supra note 18, at 128-29 (stating that confidentiality has led to
"mystification" of the juvenile court systems, which has dissembled the system's failure
to provide individualized treatment); id. at 129 (keeping journalists out of juvenile court
shields the juvenile courts from public criticism).
165. See Commonwealth v. Fisher, 62 A. 198, 201 (Pa. 1905) (holding that the
state could be "a needed substitute for parental authority and performance of parental
duty").
166. See Ketcham, supra note 12, at 10 ("Many [early juvenile court] statutes ... ad-
monished kindly judges, like good fathers, to lead misguided youths to salvation ....");
see also Mack, supra note 16, at 107 (asking why it is not proper for the juvenile court
to act "as a wise and merciful father handles his own child"); Fisher, 62 A. at 200
(stating that "[w]hether the child deserves to be saved by the state is no more a question
for a jury than whether the father, if able to save it, ought to save it").
167. See Mack, supra note 16, at 120 (suggesting a juvenile court judge as a fatherly
figure, sitting next to the child and occasionally putting his arm around him when
making a point rather than looking down upon the child from the bench, will be more
effective in his work).
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human interest and vigilance" replaced the locks and bars found in
adult prisons.' Because the purpose of reformatories was to rehabili-
tate rather than to punish, 169 the state could commit juveniles to one of
these institutions without adhering to any of the procedures that the
Constitution demands for adult criminals. 7
During the 1950s and 1960s, proponents of the juvenile court began
to lose faith in the state's ability to fulfill the promises embodied in its
role as parens patriae.T' 1 State cases began to reveal that some juvenile
court judges were more interested in punishing rather than rehabili-
tating youthful offenders.'72 Further evidence indicated that many of
the detention homes and reformatories where delinquents were sent
operated on "fear and repression,"'13 instead of the "human love, sup-
plemented by human interest and vigilance"'74 which the early
reformers had envisioned. Finally, disappointingly high recidivism
rates among juvenile offenders indicated that these prison-like insti-
tutions 175 were not successfully rehabilitating a large number of their
168. Id. at 114.
169. See Fisher, 62 A. at 201 (stating that the design of Pennsylvania's Juvenile
Court Act was not to punish but to be parental in nature; thus, the child's liberty would
not be "unduly invaded").
170. Id. (stating that the commitment of a juvenile by the state to a state institution
designed to replace proper parental authority is "not a trial for an offense requiring a
common law, or any jury").
17 1. See Ketcham, supra note 27, at 22-40 (discussing the states' failure to live up to
the promises of parens patriae).
172. In In re Barajas, 249 P.2d 350 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952), a juvenile judge
committed three boys to the California Youth Authority because they attacked a girl. Id.
The Appellate Court reversed this decision because the judge had considered only "the
seriousness of the offense and the necessity for stopping such things," without
considering what was in the best interest of the boys. Id. at 352. See Paulsen, supra
note 112, at 44, 53-54 (quoting CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR'S SPECIAL STUDY COMMISSION ON
JUVENILE JUSTICE, INTERIM REPORT 20 (1959)) ("Despite the universal agreement with the
avowed rehabilitative focus of the juvenile court philosophy, the actions of some courts
appear punitive in nature.").
In Johnson v. Johnson, 174 N.E.2d 907 (I11. App. Ct. 1961), a juvenile court judge
committed two well-behaved boys to a youth home for the damage they caused to a tree
house they were trying to repair. Id. at 909-10. Overturning the judge's decision, the
appellate court held that Illinois' Juvenile Court Act "was not intended as a means to
punish an isolated misdemeanor" by separating children from their parents. id. at 910.
In State v. Mills, 107 S.E.2d 772 (W. Va. 1959), a fourteen-year-old boy who had made
bomb threats against two local schools was committed to a reform school until he
reached the age of twenty-one. Id. at 773-74. Had the boy been an adult, the maximum
sentence of incarceration for this crime would have been thirty days. Id. at 775.
173. Ketcham, supra note 27, at 35 (quoting ALBERT DEUTSCH, OUR REJECTED
CHILDREN xix (1950)).
174. Mack, supra note 16, at 114.
175. See Ketcham, supra note 27, at 35 (quoting ALBERT DEUTSCH, OUR REJECTED
CHILDREN, xix (1950)) (stating that reformatories were not much better than prisons and
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residents. 176
The early reformers believed that the state could, like every good
parent, dispense with procedural rights in its pursuit of what was in
the best interest of its wayward children.' 77 As faith in the state's
ability to play the parent began to wane, recognition of the need for
some procedural restraints began to emerge. 78
b. Due Process and Fairness
In the late 1960s, the Supreme Court began rejecting the notion that
a juvenile court need not concern itself with due process. In Kent v.
United States, 179 the Court noted the possibility that children in juve-
nile courts suffer because they do not enjoy the procedural protections
that criminal courts extend to defendants, nor do they experience the
rehabilitative care that the juvenile justice system promises them. 8 °
The Court in Kent therefore determined that the basic requirements of
due process and fairness should be observed in a hearing which deter-
mined whether a minor had effectively waived his juvenile status. 8'
In In re Gault, 82 the Court noted that the absence of procedural
safeguards in juvenile proceedings often led to arbitrariness and
unfairness rather than care and necessary treatment. 83 The Court in
were, in fact, considerably worse than prisons in terms of "corporal and other degrading
punishments").
176. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. I, 22 (1967) (citing a study by the Stanford Research
Institute for the President's Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia, which
found that "approximately 66 percent of the 16-and-17-year[-olds] referred to the court
by the Youth Aid Division had been before the court previously."); see also Ketcham,
supra note 27, at 35 (highlighting the dilemma faced by many juvenile court judges).
Ketcham asks: "[S]hould the delinquent be committed to a training school, where his
chances of reformation are statistically slight, or should he be returned to the pernicious
environment of his home and neighborhood . . . ?" Id.; WALTER A. LUNDEN, STATISTICS
ON DELINQUENTS AND DELINQUENCY 124-31 (1964) (reporting several studies of juvenile
delinquent recidivism).
177. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fisher, 62 A. 198, 201 (Pa. 1905) (stating that the
"design [of the Pennsylvania's Juvenile Court Act] is not punishment, nor the restraint
[of] imprisonment, any more than is the wholesome restraint which a parent exercises
over his child").
178. See Ketcham, supra note 27, at 38 (calling for the introduction to and
application of "due process and fair treatment for the child and his parent" in the
nation's juvenile courts).
179. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
180. Id. at 556 (postulating that juveniles may receive "the worst of both worlds
[because they get] neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and
regenerative treatment postulated for children").
181. Id. at 553-54.
182. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
183. Id. at 18-19. Specifically, the Court stated that the "absence of procedural rules
based upon constitutional principle has not always produced fair, efficient, and effective
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Gault also extended the need for due process and fairness to the
adjudicatory stage of the juvenile process, during which the child is
determined to be delinquent and may be committed to a state facility.'4
c. Confidentiality and the Constitution
The power of the juvenile courts to maintain confidentiality has been
weakened by conflicts with the Constitution. In In re Gault, the
Supreme Court stated in dicta that states could continue the practice of
maintaining juvenile confidentiality, as long as they did so in a way
consistent with due process. 85 Although preserving the confidenti-
ality of juvenile offenders was one of the most important powers of the
juvenile court, after Gault, it became clear that none of the parens
patriae powers would prevail in a direct conflict with the
Constitution. 86
d. The Shift to Criminal Court-like Proceedings
The Supreme Court brought the juvenile courts within the domain of
the Constitution by rejecting the notion that what takes place in a juve-
nile proceeding is fundamentally different from what takes place in a
criminal trial. In In re Gault, for instance, the Supreme Court rejected
the idea that the prospect of confinement that a juvenile faces is funda-
mentally different from the prospect of incarceration that a criminal
faces. 187 The Court in Gault further rejected the assertion that the
constitutional guarantee of due process does not apply to juveniles., 88
procedures. Departures from established principles of due process have frequently
resulted not in enlightened procedure, but in arbitrariness." Id.
184. Id. at 13.
185. Id. at 25. "[T]here is no reason why, consistently with due process, a State
cannot continue, if it deems it appropriate, to provide and to improve provision for the
confidentiality of [juvenile) records . I..." d.
186. In Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), the Supreme Court held that a criminal
defendant's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation was superior to the state's interest
in protecting a juvenile's confidentiality. Id. at 319. Additionally, the Supreme Court
held in Smith v. Daily Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979), that the state's interest in
preserving the anonymity of a juvenile offender is not sufficient to justify punishing a
newspaper that published a juvenile offender's name. Id. at 104.
187. Gault, 387 U.S. at 25. The Court stated:
The fact of the matter is that, however euphemistic the title, a "receiving
home" or an "industrial school" for juveniles is an institution of confinement
in which the child is incarcerated . . . . His world becomes "a building with
whitewashed walls, regimented routine and institutional hours .... "Instead
of mother and father and sisters and brothers and friends and classmates, his
world is peopled by guards, custodians, state employees, and "delinquents"
confined with him for anything from waywardness to rape and homicide.
Id. (quoting Holmes's Appeal, 379 Pa. 599, 616 (1954) (Musmanno, J., dissenting)).
188. Gault, 387 U.S. at 28. The Gault Court declared that "[u]nder our Constitution,
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The early reformers envisioned an informal proceeding in which a
fatherly judge and a wayward boy would sit side by side so the judge
could put his arm around the bad boy 89 and gently lead him back onto
the righteous path.' 90 But the Supreme Court insisted that the child's
lawyer and most of the rest of the rights provided in the Constitution
also be present at these proceedings.' 9' As a result, the juvenile court
proceeding of today more closely resembles a criminal trial than it
resembles the proceeding envisioned by the early reformers.
III. DISCUSSION
In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,192 the United States Supreme Court
explained that the more the juvenile courts resemble criminal courts,
the weaker the justification for maintaining a separate justice system
for juveniles becomes.' 93 Preserving the anonymity of those who
came before it has traditionally been one of the things which has distin-
guished the juvenile court from criminal courts. '9 Juvenile courts of
today are finding that the diminution of their parens patriae powers has
eroded their ability to maintain that confidentiality.'95 With subscrip-
the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court." Id.
189. Mack, supra note 16, at 120 (recommending that the judge put his arm around
the delinquent when emphasizing an important point).
190. Id. at 122. Mack suggests that those juveniles "who are treading the downward
path shall be halted and led back." Id.
191. An interesting exception is the right to a trial by jury. In McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971), the Supreme Court held:
[A] jury trial, if required as a matter of constitutional precept, will remake the
juvenile proceeding into a fully adversary process and will put an effective end
to what has been the idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal, protective
proceeding . . . . Meager as has been the hoped-for advance in the juvenile
field, the alternative would be regressive . . . .and would tend once again to
place the juvenile squarely in the routine of the criminal process.
McLaughlin & Whisenand, supra note 12, at 8 (quoting McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545-47).
192. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
193. Id. at 551. The McKeiver Court stated: "If the formalities of the criminal
adjudicative process are to be superimposed upon the juvenile court system, there is
little need for its separate existence." Id.
194. See supra part II.A.2 (explaining how the practice of preserving juvenile
confidentiality fit into the early thinking regarding the juvenile justice system); see
also supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing how preserving the juvenile's
anonymity was crucial to the early reformers' plan for rehabilitation).
195. See, e.g., Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 104 (1979)
(holding that the state may not use its parens patriae powers to punish a newspaper that
legally obtains and subsequently publishes the identity of a juvenile delinquent); Davis
v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319 (1974) (holding that the state's parens patriae power in
protecting juvenile confidentiality may not supersede a criminal defendant's
confrontation rights).
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tion to the doctrine of Cparens patriae on the wane,'9 and fear of juve-
nile crime on the rise;' some states have begun to rescind the practice
of protecting the identities of their more violent delinquents. 98
A. The Supreme Court and Juvenile Confidentiality
Although the Supreme Court has never decided a case that required
it to consider the constitutionality of a juvenile's right to confiden-
tiality,' 99 a series of decisions dealing with juvenile courts has led
federal and state appellate courts to conclude that this right is not con-
stitutional in nature. 20° Preserving juvenile confidentiality remains a
legitimate state interest, 20' but the practice of maintaining a juvenile's
confidentiality must not infringe on any constitutional right. In In re
Gault,2 2 the Court stated in dicta that the practice of maintaining juve-
nile confidentiality must be maintained in a manner consistent with due
process.2 3 In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,' the Court held that states
have the privilege, but not a constitutional obligation, to grant juveniles
196. See supra part II.B.3. (discussing the deterioration of the parens patriae
doctrine).
197. See infra part IV (discussing the various causes of society's rising concern with
juvenile crime).
198. See infra part III.C.
199. See Davis, 415 U.S. at 319. "We do not and need not challenge the State's
interest as a matter of its own policy in the administration of criminal justice to seek to
preserve the anonymity of a juvenile offender." Id.; see also Susan S. Greenbaum,
Conditional Access to Juvenile Court Proceedings: A Prior Restraint or a Viable
Solution?, 44 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 135 n.12 (1993) (noting that the
Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of whether juveniles have a due process right
to confidentiality).
200. See J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1090 (6th Cir. 1981) (holding that the
Constitution does not require confidentiality of juvenile court records); see also Doe v.
Wigginton, 21 F.3d 733, 740 (6th Cir. 1994) (using DeSanti to reject a prison inmate's
claim that disclosure to a corrections officer of the inmate's Human Immuno-deficiency
Virus infection was an unconstitutional invasion of privacy); In re Chase, 446 N.Y.S.2d
1000, 1008 (1982) (holding that a juvenile's right to confidentiality is not
constitutional in nature).
201. See Davis, 415 U.S. at 319 (declining to challenge a state's interest in
maintaining juvenile anonymity as long as there is no conflict with the Constitution);
see also Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1979) (recognizing
the state's interest in preserving juvenile anonymity, but holding that it is not
sufficient to impose a criminal penalty on the exercise of the First Amendment right of a
newspaper to publish legally obtained information).
202. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
203. Id. at 25. "[T]here is no reason why, consistently with due process, a State
cannot continue if it deems it appropriate, to provide and to improve provision for the
confidentiality of records of police contacts and court action relating to juveniles." Id.
204. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
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a public jury trial.205 In Davis v. Alaska,2' the Court held that since a
juvenile's right to confidentiality springs from state law, it is therefore
merely a "policy interest" which must give way to a criminal defen-
dant's Sixth Amendment right to conduct an appropriate cross-
examination, even if this requires revealing the juvenile's prior adjudi-
cations of delinquency. 7 Finally, in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing
Co., 2°8 the Court held that the First Amendment prevents states from
punishing members of the news media who publish the identity of a
juvenile, when that information is obtained lawfully.2°9 By drawing
attention to the fact that a juvenile's right to confidentiality springs
from state law rather than the Constitution,2 the Supreme Court
paved the way for states to rescind their earlier promises to protect
juveniles from social stigmas.
B. Juvenile Confidentiality and the Political Process
Because juveniles do not appear to have a constitutional right to
confidentiality, the states do not have to continue providing it. The
issue of preserving juvenile confidentiality, therefore, is a political, not
a constitutional question. The political landscape, however, is no
longer favorable for juvenile courts."' The country as a whole is
205. Id. at 547. The McKeiver Court explained:
The imposition of the jury trial on the juvenile court system would not
strengthen greatly, if at all, the fact-finding function, and would, contrarily,
provide an attrition of the juvenile court's assumed ability to function in a
unique manner. It would not remedy the defects of the system. Meager as has
been the hoped-for advance in the juvenile field, the alternative would be
regressive, would lose what has been gained, and would tend once again to
place the juvenile squarely in the routine of the criminal process.
Id.
206. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
207. Id. at 320. "The State's policy interest in protecting the confidentiality of a
juvenile offender's record cannot require yielding of so vital a constitutional right as the
effective cross-examination for bias of an adverse witness." Id.
208. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
209. Id. at 105-06.
210. See Davis, 415 U.S. at 319-20.
211. See Ted Gest & Dorian Friedman, The New Crime Wave, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Aug. 29, 1994, at 26. States, in reacting to growing concerns over juvenile crime
"are extending prisoner terms for young criminals, sending more for trial as adults and
lifting the traditional confidentiality of juvenile files to enable tougher prosecution of
repeat offenders." Id. See also James A. Fox & Glenn Pierce, American Killers Are
Getting Younger, USA TODAY (magazine), Jan. 1994, at 26 (asserting that state
legislatures have overreacted to the rising concerns about juvenile crime by passing
laws allowing more juveniles to be tried as adults); Joe Klein, How About a Swift Kick?,
NEWSWEEK, July 26, 1993, at 30 (asserting that strict discipline can "inspire kids
growing up in the most desperate circumstances"). See generally Pipho, supra note 10,
at 286 (noting that recent increases in juvenile crime rates have prompted various states
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experiencing a backlash against the various forms of determinism that
lie at the heart of the doctrine of parens patriae2" Furthermore,
responding to the public's growing intolerance of the special treatment
afforded to juveniles who break the law, some state legislatures have
begun to pull back the protective cloak of confidentiality. 213
C. Four General Approaches of State Legislatures
There are four general categories of state laws dealing with juvenile
confidentiality. The first category of laws gives juvenile judges vari-
ous degrees of discretion regarding the disclosure of juvenile court
records.1 4 The second category of laws mandates disclosure to at risk
school personnel. 2 5  The third category mandates disclosure for a
specified group of juvenile felons.216 Finally, the fourth category
mandates disclosure of most or all juvenile felons.217
1. Judicial Discretion
Several state laws grant juvenile judges various degrees of
discretion to disclose juvenile records. This category has two subsets.
In the first subset, states like Ohio and Minnesota provide juvenile
judges a closed list of the persons, agencies, institutions, and courts to
which they may disclose juvenile records.218 In the second subset,
states like Kentucky, Maryland, and Nevada permit judges to disclose
juvenile identities to persons or entities who show good cause or a
to enact stricter juvenile crime laws); Sudo, supra note 10, at 10-12 (describing the
emergence of a get-tough approach to juvenile crime).
212. See infra part IV.A.
213. See infra part IV.C.
214. See infra part III.C.1.
215. See infra part 11I.C.2.
216. See infra part Ill.C.3.
217. See infra part I11.C.4.
218. Ohio law permits juvenile judges to disclose juvenile court records to the child,
the child's guardian, the prosecutor, a public school board, the probation department of
the juvenile court, agencies which have custody of the child, agencies that provide
services to the child or his family, agencies which prepare social histories or provide
other functions of the juvenile court, the department of youth services, those in charge
of detention or rehabilitation of the juvenile, employees of the juvenile court, or any
other entity that has custody of the child or is involved in the child's treatment. OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.14 (Baldwin 1995).
The relevant Minnesota statute also enumerates the persons or entities that may
receive juvenile records pursuant to judicial discretion. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.161
(West 1995). Juvenile judges in Minnesota, however, may disclose juvenile records to
these persons or entities only if they determine it is necessary for the public safety or
serves the best interest of the child. Id.
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legitimate interest in viewing the juvenile's records.21 9
2. Mandatory Disclosure to the Delinquent's School
In this category states like California and Connecticut require their
juvenile courts to release juvenile records to officials of the delin-
quent's school.220 California law authorizes the juvenile court to re-
lease a juvenile's records to any school official necessary to avoid
"needless vulnerability.,, 22' The Connecticut statute, on the other
hand, requires that the juvenile court judge release delinquency
records, which are to be used solely for placement and discipline pur-
poses, only to the superintendent of the juvenile's school district. 222
3. Public Disclosure for Certain Serious Offenses
Missouri2 23 Illinois, 2 4 and Louisiana 225 statutes illustrate the third
approach to disclosure of juvenile identities. Missouri provides for
public disclosure of the identities of juveniles adjudicated delinquent
for committing Missouri's most serious felonies, including capital
murder, and first and second degree murder. 26 Illinois provides for
disclosure to the general public of the name, address, and offense of
any juvenile adjudicated delinquent on the basis of, or convicted under
the criminal law of, first degree murder, attempted murder, aggravated
219. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 610.340 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1994) (authorizing
judges to release juvenile records if they have good cause); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD.
PROC. § 3-828 (1994) (authorizing judges to release juvenile records if they have good
cause); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 62.360 (Michie 1993) (authorizing judges to release
juvenile court records to anyone showing a legitimate interest in those records),
amended by 1995 Nev. Stat. 567 (permitting release of a juvenile's name if such juvenile
is a party to a civil action in which the juvenile's conduct is the subject of such action
and if the court has previously had jurisdiction over the juvenile).
220. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 827 (West Supp. 1995), as amended by, S.B. 1092,
1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. 71 (West); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-124 (West 1995), as
amended by 1994 Conn. Legis. Serv. § 46b-124 (West).
221. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 827 (West Supp. 1995), as amended by S.B. 1092,
1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. 71 (West).
222. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-124(West 1995), as amended by 1994 Conn.
Legis. Serv. § 46b-124 (West).
223. Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.321 (1994) (amended 1995) (amendments not germane to
this article).
224. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 705, § 405/1-8 (1995).
225. 1995 La. Sess. Law Serv. 412(1) (West).
226. Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.321. Only the commission of "A" class felonies (the
most serious) render juveniles subject to this law. Id. "A" class felonies in Missouri
include: first degree murder, second degree murder, rape, first degree robbery, treason,
assault which inflicts serious injury, escape from prison, and certain uses of explosives.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 557.016.
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criminal sexual assault, and criminal sexual assault.227 The Illinois law
further provides for public disclosure of the names, addresses, and
offenses of juveniles who were over the age of thirteen when the
offense was committed, and who were adjudicated delinquent on the
basis of, or convicted in criminal court of, a felony committed as or on
behalf of a member of a gang, a felony involving a firearm, and certain
drug offenses.22
Louisiana provides for the disclosure of juveniles who are adjudi-
cated delinquent on the basis of committing a "crime of violence. 2 29
Unlike any other state using this approach, however, Louisiana allows
for the disclosure of some juvenile felons even before they are adjudi-
230cated delinquent. If a juvenile is charged with an offense that is
considered a "crime of violence," 231 or is charged with an offense that
would become his "second or subsequent felony-grade adjudication,"
he is subjected to a pretrial hearing in which the judge decides, based
on the weight of the evidence against the juvenile, whether the district
attorney shall be allowed to disclose the juvenile's identity.232
4. Disclosure of Most or All Juvenile Felons
States in this fourth and final category, including New Jersey,233
Idaho,234 Kansas,235 Colorado,236 and provide for the automatic dis-
closure of most or all of their juvenile felons. New Jersey law dis-
closes the identities of delinquent juveniles who commit any of several
2371 ,lcc hcrimes, unless the juvenile succeeds in demonstrating that there is
227. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 705, § 405/1-8 (West Supp. 1995).
228. Id.
229. LA. CHILD. CODE. ANN. § 412(B)(7), as amended by S.B. 1412, 1995 La. Sess.
Law Serv. 1313 (West). Crimes defined as "crimes of violence" include all degrees of
murder, rape, battery and other offenses which involve the threat of use of force. LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:2(13) (West 1995). For the entire list of crimes of violence, see
id.
230. LA. CHILD. CODE. ANN. § 412(l), as amended by S.B. 1412, 1995 La. Sess. Law
Serv. 1313 (West).
231. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:2(13) (West 1995) (listing the crimes of
violence).
232. LA. CHILD. CODE. ANN. § 412(I), as amended by S.B. 1412, 1995 La. Sess. Law
Serv. 1313 (West). The judge in these hearings considers the "probity of the evidence
and the basis of the probable cause" of the case against the juvenile. Id.
233. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-60 (West Supp. 1995), as amended by Assembly No.
1629, 1995 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 135 (West).
234. IDAHO CODE § 20-525 (Supp. 1995).
235. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1607 (Supp. 1994).
236. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-1-119(l)(b.5) (West Supp. 1995).
237. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-60 (West Supp. 1995), as amended by Assembly No.
1629, 1995 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 135 (West) (listing crimes of the first, second, or third
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"a substantial likelihood that specific and extraordinary harm would
result from such disclosure in the specific case." 238
In a law similar to New Jersey's, Idaho provides for the disclosure
of the court records of nearly every delinquency case that comes before
its juvenile courts.2 39 The only exception occurs when the juvenile
court judge issues a written order forbidding disclosure in a specific
case. 
24 0
Kansas provides for public disclosure of certain court records of all
juvenile felons who are fourteen or older. 24' The Kansas legislature
recently lowered the age of disclosure from sixteen to fourteen.242
Kansas subjects the police records of its juvenile felons, fourteen and
over, "to the same disclosure restrictions as the records of adults.
2 43
Colorado provides for the public disclosure of the court records of
every juvenile who is adjudicated delinquent on the basis of commit-
ting acts constituting a class 1, 2, 3, or 4 felony or any crime involving
the possession or use of a weapon.2 " Colorado, therefore, subjects
every juvenile felon to public scrutiny.
IV. ANALYSIS
This Part analyzes the philosophical and practical reasons behind the
popular discontent with the juvenile justice system, which has led to
support for rescinding juvenile confidentiality. It then analyzes how
some states are responding to the movement toward disclosure.
A. Rejecting the Philosophy
The syllogism that justifies the existence of a juvenile court system
that rehabilitates rather than punishes is as follows: Juveniles are not
responsible for their actions because they suffer from any of a number
of maladies that compel their deviancy;2 45 punishing juveniles for
actions which are determined by forces beyond their control exacer-
degree, aggravated assault, or destruction or damage of property to an extent of more
than $500).
238. Id.
239. IDAHO CODE § 20-525 (Supp. 1995).
240. Id.
241. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1608(c) (Supp. 1994).
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-1-119 (1)(b.5) (1I)(A) (West Supp. 1995).
245. For a discussion of the sundry determinants the early reformers believed to cause
delinquency see supra notes 84-91 and accompanying text.
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bates rather than alleviates those maladies; 246 therefore, the juvenile
court system should direct its efforts toward treating these maladies
rather than punishing the afflicted. 247 Thus, public support for rehabil-
itating rather than punishing juveniles hinges on the public's subscrip-
tion to determinist etiologies. 24' Determinist etiologies of juvenile
crime received the public's support when the public believed in the
scientific promises that developed and sprang from those etiologies.249
The public today, however, is more likely to consider a determinist
explanation of juvenile crime as an excuse rather than a scientific
diagnosis.
1. Etiology or Excuse?
In 1949, Gustav Schramm predicted that the extension of the ideas
underlying the juvenile court system to the adult criminal justice sys-
tem was inevitable. ° Today, it is clear that the practice of shielding
actors from the moral culpability of their actions, which formed the
basis for Schramm's theory, has made its way into our nation's crimi-
nal courts25' and our nation's sense of morality in general. 25 2 The "I
did it, but I was a victim" defense has helped criminal defendants
avoid punishment,253 and many others avoid personal responsibility
246. See, e.g., Mack, supra note 16, at 107 (placing juveniles in adult prisons
"criminalize[s]" them).
247. For a discussion of proposed methods of treating delinquency, see supra notes
92, 98-113.
248. See supra part iI.A.I.
249. See supra part II.A.I.
250. Schramm, supra note 146, at 205.
251. See, e.g., Margaret Carlson, That Killer Smile, TIME, Feb. 7, 1994, at 76.
"Victimology has turned out to be the winning [criminal defense] tactic of our era." id.
252. See, e.g., CHARLES J. SYKES, A NATION OF VIcIMs: THE DECAY OF THE AMERICAN
CHARACTER. 11 (1992). "The ethos of victimization has an endless capacity . . . for
exculpating one's self from blame, washing away responsibility in a torrent of
explanation-racism, sexism, rotten parents, addiction, and illness .... . Id.; see also
John Taylor, Don't Blame Me! The New Culture of Victimization, NEW YORK, June 3,
1991, at 26. Taylor writes:
It's a strange phenomenon, this growing compulsion of Americans of all
creeds, colors, and incomes, of the young and the old, the infirm and the
robust, the guilty as well as the innocent, to ascribe to themselves the status
of victims to try to find someone or something else to blame for whatever is
wrong or incomplete or just plain unpleasant about their lives.
Id. at 28.
253. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 251, at 76. Lyle and Erik Menendez admitted
killing their parents, but mounted a victim defense which resulted in two separate hung
juries. Id. Claiming to have been victims of abuse, the Menendez brothers convinced
members of their respective juries that they shot their parents, who were watching
television at the time, because they believed their parents were going to kill them. Id.
A jury in Virginia acquitted Lorena Bobbitt, agreeing that her husband's abuse
1996]
382 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 27
for their actions.
In the face of a surfeit of claims to victimhood, the doctrine of per-
sonal responsibility is making a comeback in American political and
philosophical thought. 5  The practice of avoiding blame for one's
actions is becoming increasingly bitter to the American palate.2 5 6 In a
recent issue of Time magazine, Margaret Carlson expressed the
exasperation that is at the:heart of society's increasing discontent with
those who avoid personal responsibility: "How did we go from a
society that brooked no excuses to one that embraces every expla-
nation; from a society that distinguished right from wrong to one that
understands all and punishes nothing?" 7
The early reformers used the behavioral theories of Karl Marx,
Sigmund Freud, and Charles Darwin to develop their deterministic
theories that social, psychological, and biological conditions determine
juvenile actions. 58 Today, however, even the above founding philos-
ophies of the juvenile justice system are under attack for destroying
society's sense of morality.259 As a result, some child advocates are
provoked an "irresistible impulse" to mutilate him. Bobbilt Acquitted, Taken to Mental
Hospital, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Jan. 22, 1994, at IA.
254. See, e.g., SYKES, supra note 252, at 11. Describing the prevalence of
invocations to victimhood, Sykes writes:
Something extraordinary is happening in American society. Crisscrossed by
invisible trip wires of emotional, racial, sexual, and psychological grievance,
American life is increasingly characterized by the plaintive insistence, I am a
victim .... [Throughout the nation], the mantra of the victims is the same: I
am not responsible; it's not my fault.
Id.
255. See generally Michael Ruby, Creeping Responsibility?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., June 27, 1994, at 80 (citing indications of a backlash against irresponsibility).
256. For a sample of the rising discontent over avoiding responsibility, see
generally SYKES, supra note 252 (describing and criticizing the "victimization" of
America); Arianna Huffington, Don't Blame Me!, FAMILY CIRCLE, Jan. 11, 1994, at 156.
Huffington states:
When we set sail for the moral equivalent of Club Med, we pay our passage by
handing over some assumptions about what it means to be human. The
concept of free will is the first to go-after all, if our destiny is out of our hands,
so are our decisions. When free will packs its bags, individual responsibility
leaves hot on its heels-because if our actions ain't [sic] our choice, they sure
ain't [sic] our fault.
Id. See also Jesse Birnbaum, Crybabies: Eternal Victims, TIME, Aug. 12, 1991, at 16.
"Hypersensitivity and special pleading are making a travesty of the virtues that used to
be known as individual responsibility and common sense." Id.
257. Carlson, supra note 251, at 76.
258. Jeffery, supra note 80.
259. A Newsweek review of James Q. Wilson's recent book, The Moral Sense,
reveals the depths of the current rejection of the foundations of the determinism
employed by the juvenile justice system:
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beginning to question whether using determinism to shield delinquents
from realizing the moral consequences of their actions is counter-
productive to the prospect of rehabilitation.2'6
Yet another sign that morality may be making a comeback can be
seen in the fact that many contemporary proponents of the juvenile
justice system employ a softer form of determinism, 26' adding free will
as a sporadic agent intheir etiological theories.262 But even this softer
form of determinism does not appear to receive much popular sub-
scription. Importunities for compassion based on the assertion that
society's failings are responsible for personal action are not likely to
overcome the growing backlash against victimization.263 Any attempt
Wilson argues that we are paying the price for a century of intellectual
wrongheadedness. The legatees of Marx, Freud and Darwin argued that morality
was a chimera; it had 'no basis in science or logic.' Moralists were forced to
flee to the musty backwaters of philosophy and theology; the barbarians took
hold of public policy. 'It is difficult to say what effects have followed [our]
effort to talk ourselves out of having a moral sense,' Wilson writes. 'We may
have harmed vulnerable children who ought to have received surer guidance
from family and neighborhoods; we may have promoted self-indulgence when
we thought we were only endorsing freedom.'
Klein, supra note 211, at 30 (quoting, summarizing, and endorsing JAMES Q. WILSON,
THE MORAL SENSE (1993)).
260. See, e.g., MATZA, supra note 18 (noting that shielding delinquents from the
moral expectations imposed on everyone else may actually exacerbate their feelings of
alienation); Lacayo, supra note 9, at 61. "It's imperative for serious juvenile offenders
to know they will face a sanction . . . Too many of them don't understand what
punishment means because they have been raised in a world with no understanding of
reward and punishment." Id. (quoting Attorney General Janet Reno).
261. For a discussion of soft determinism's emergence into and influence on juvenile
justice etiologies, see supra notes 134-144 and accompanying text.
262. See, e.g., JACOBS, supra note 95, at 21 (espousing Albert Reiss's theory that
delinquency is a failure of social as well as personal controls and espousing Erik
Erikson's psychosocial theory that delinquency is an embrace of a negative identity to
escape confusion regarding their present schooling and their beliefs of future
employment); id. at 124 (noting that contemporary juvenile probation officers are
reluctant to relieve juveniles and their parents from responsibility for their actions).
In 1992, Thomas J. Bernard, in THE CYCLE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE wrote:
[L]et us admit that we choose to live with the problem of juvenile delinquency
because it is less costly and more convenient than choosing to solve it ....
Let us respond to delinquents in the spirit of the founders of the first juvenile
court: as firm but kindly parents. We cannot ignore delinquent behavior, but
we must not forget that to some extent it is the result of our own choices.
Conscious of our own failings, let us be more gentle with the failings of these
juveniles.
BERNARD, supra note 67, at 188.
263. Julia Reed, It's Not My Fault! Should We Really Think Any Excuse Will Do?,
VOGUE, May 1994, condensed and reprinted in READER'S DIGEST, Aug. 1994, at 113,
114. 'There has arisen this insane notion that we deserve a perfect life with nice parents
and lots of stuff, and that anything short of that is grounds for committing murder or
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to shield juveniles from accountability, even in the form of a "soft
determinism," is becoming increasingly unpopular because America is
beginning to reject the philosophical pillars of the juvenile justice
system.264
Emblematic of how the rising discontent over attempts to avoid per-
sonal responsibility exacerbates the rising discontent with the juvenile
justice system is a letter to the editor. of The Washington Post, written
by Maryland State Representative Ulysses Currie.265 Supporting a bill
before the Maryland State Legislature, Representative Currie noted that
in 1991 nearly twenty-nine percent of the suspects arrested in
Maryland for murder, rape, robbery, assault, breaking and entering,
larceny, and motor vehicle theft were juveniles. Representative Currie
offered the following explanation for these alarming statistics:
One reason for [this] dismal figure is that Maryland's juvenile
justice system is based largely on a philosophy . . . that holds
that young offenders are not fully aware of right and wrong and
therefore should not be held responsible for their crimes to the
same extent that adults are held responsible. But that is out of
sync with reality. Many young offenders today are hard-core
criminals who have long arrest records for serious crimes by the
time they are eighteen. And most of them know that juvenile law
tips the scales of justice in their favor. 266
The criticisms the public levels against determinism in general and
the juvenile justice system specifically, which focus on a failure to
hold people accountable for their actions, suggest a movement in favor
of a more traditional view of morality. By rejecting the determinist
assertion that no action is of moral consequence because no action is
mayhem." Id. See also Klein, supra note 211 , at 30 (decrying the prevalence of moral
relativism in public policy); Joe Saltzman, Who's the Real Victim?, USA TODAY
(magazine) July 1994, at 49 (criticizing the practice of portraying criminal defendants
as victims).
264. See supra part II.B.l-3.
265. Currie, supra note 28, at C8.
266. Id. Representative Currie's remarks illustrate a common identification of the
juvenile court system's philosophy with the juvenile court system's failure. See, e.g.,
Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment,
Treatment, & the Difference It Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 836 (1988) (discussing the
trend towards dispositions which focus on the severity of the offense rather than the
needs of the child); Martin L. Forst & Martha-Elin Blomquist, Cracking Down on
Juveniles: The Changing Ideology of Youth Corrections, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHIcs &
PUB. POL'Y 323, 342-45 (1991) (discussing proposed changes to the juvenile justice
system's philosophy which would make the system more punitive in nature). Bob
Herbert, Little Criminals, Big Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1994, at E13 (blaming the
failure of the New York juvenile court system on the desire to go easy on juveniles).
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truly voluntary,267 society appears to yearn for something approaching
an Aristotelian construct of ethics, in which the only actions that are
excused from moral relevance are those few that are completely
beyond the control of the actor.268
2. The Vanishing Doctrine of Adolescence
Representative Currie's remarks reflect a rapidly spreading belief
that the philosophy of the juvenile court system is too solicitous to deal
with today's hardened and more violent juveniles. 269 G. Stanley Hall
and other child psychologists in the nineteenth century argued that chil-
dren are not masters of their thoughts, nor are they responsible for
their behavior until they pass through their teenage years.2 The early
reformers used this doctrine of adolescence to absolve juveniles from
moral and criminal culpability. 271 Today, several states are finding
increasing support for the proposition that delinquents are responsible
for their crimes and should, therefore, be held accountable to the com-
272munity.
Although there is little evidence to suggest that the experiment the
early reformers conducted based on that philosophy was ever success-
.ful in its attempts to rehabilitate delinquents,273 society countenanced
267. For a more thorough exposition of the determinist theory, see Blanshard, supra
note 83, at 3-15.
268. In THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Aristotle writes that those who commit
involuntary acts deserve pardon, and sometimes even pity. See ARISTOTLE, supra note
65, at 964. Aristotle's parochial definition of an involuntary act, however, excludes
acts that are not the product of pure compulsion or blameless ignorance. Id. The agent's
ignorance cannot be in any way the fault of the agent, and the agent must feel pain and
regret when he learns the consequences of his actions. Id. at 966.
269. See, e.g., Lacayo, supra note 9, at 60. "America's juvenile justice system is
antiquated and no longer able to cope with the violence wrought by children whom no
one would call innocents." Id.
270. See MENNEL, supra note 75, at 81 (crediting Hall with laying the foundation of
the modern views of childhood, youth, and adolescence). See also supra part lI.A. I.a
(discussing the emergence of the theory of adolescence).
271. See supra part I.A.l.
272. See Lacayo, supra note 9, at 60 (describing a 1994 North Carolina law which
allows children as young as thirteen to be tried as adults); Id. at 60-61 (describing
similar laws in Arkansas, California and Georgia); see also SYKES, supra note 252, at
245 (noting the trend for juvenile courts to abandon the "there-are-no-bad-boys policy"
of the early reformers); Currie, supra note 28, at C8 (supporting a bill before the
Maryland State Legislature which would make violent delinquents more accountable for
their crimes); John F. Harris, State Law Will Mark 'Bad Kids': Schools to Get Access to
Juvenile Records, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 1993, at v1 (reporting a recent Virginia law that
authorizes school boards to exclude students who have been expelled from any school in
the nation for incidents involving weapons, violence or drugs).
273. See supra part lI.B.2 (discussing the early reformer's disappointment over their
efforts to rehabilitate); see also FAUST & BRANTINGHAM, supra note 13, at 149
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the experiment's failure for decades because delinquents did not pose
much of a threat. The alarming rise in the severity and frequency of
juvenile crime today, however, makes tolerating the juvenile court sys-
tem's failures much more difficult.27 4 Aside from becoming increas-
ingly severe and frequent, today's juvenile crime has become
gratuitous, and today's delinquents often show no remorse.2" The
acknowledged failure of the juvenile courts to rehabilitate,276 and the
increasing frequency, violence, and gratuity2 7 of today's juvenile
violence, makes the cost of subscribing to the doctrine of adolescence,
which absolves juveniles from moral accountability, too much for
society to bear.2
(theorizing that the fact that most juveniles during the early years of the juvenile justice
reform movement did eventually stop their deviancy was probably due more to "the
normal process of human social maturation" than to the massive efforts and resources
dedicated to rehabilitating delinquents).
274. See, e.g., 3 Texas Teenagers Join 2 Others On Death Row For Same Murders,
CHi. TRIB., Sept. 26, 1994, at 4 (citing and quoting the crime historian, Robert
Lineberry) (reporting that the first and the second most common ages of those arrested
for committing felonies are sixteen and-fifteen, respectively); Fox & Pierce, supra note
10, at 24, 25 (reporting that incidents of murder committed by juveniles between the
ages of fourteen and seventeen rose 124 percent between the years 1986 and 1991).
As University of Houston Professor Robert Lineberry explains: "The composition of
crime is changing .... In the past, teenagers tended to at worst knock off the 7-eleven
store. These days, teenagers knock off the store and murder the manager at the same
time. That was almost unheard of 20 or 30 or 50 years ago." 3 Texas Teenagers Join 2
Others On Death Row For Same Murders, supra, at 4 (citing and quoting the crime
historian, Robert Lineberry).
275. According to Juvenile Court Judge Susan R. Winfield, presiding judge of. the
Family Division of the Washington, D.C., Superior Court, "[t]here is far more gratuitous
violence and far more anger [and] shooting . . . . Youngsters used to shoot each other in
the body. Then in the head. Now they shoot each other in the face." Lacayo, supra note
9, at 61 (quoting Judge Winfield). See also Toufexis, supra note 10, at 52.
What is chilling about many of the young criminals is that they show no
remorse or conscience, at least initially. Youths brag about their exploits and
shrug off victims' pain. A Chicago case in which four teenagers raped and
killed a medical student was solved because of good police work and what Pat
O'Brien, Cook County deputy state's attorney, describes as "the defendants'
inability to keep their mouths shut" about the crime. "It was a badge ... It was
something they talked about as if it gave them status within that group of
guys." Youngsters [also] offhandedly refer to innocent passersby caught in the
line of gunfire between two gangs as "mushrooms."
Id.
276. See supra part II.B.2.
277. See supra notes 274-75 and accompanying text.
278. For a discussion of the growing support for treating juvenile felons more like
adults, see supra note 272 and accompanying text.
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B. The Need For Disclosure
The recent movement among the states to rescind the practice of
maintaining juvenile confidentiality represents a split between what is
perceived to be good for the child and what is perceived to be good for
the community. 279 This split has occurred because people have lost
confidence in the state's ability to rehabilitate juvenile offenders.280
Treating young lawbreakers with the fatherly "care and solicitude" pre-
scribed by the early reformers281 is acceptable only if it is successful.
If efforts to rehabilitate delinquents are unsuccessful, 2  then a juvenile
justice system which refuses to punish delinquents is destined for
public obloquy, because society is left with unreformed lawbreakers
who can threaten public safety without fear of punishment.2 3
The aim of the juvenile courts in preserving the confidentiality of
juvenile records is "to hide youthful errors from the full gaze of the
public and bury them in the graveyard of the forgotten past. ' 284 But
the phrase "youthful errors" should never describe the murders, rapes,
and other serious offenses that juveniles are now committing. 285
Society will no longer tolerate protecting today's juveniles when
society itself feels threatened by these very same juveniles. The alarm-
279. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
280. For a discussion of the deterioration of faith in the state's ability to perform as
parens patriae, see supra part II.B.3. See also Kfoury, supra note 21, at 67 (observing
that "juvenile felons are no longer necessarily viewed as salvageable or productive
beings whose rehabilitation is more significant to society than their punishment").
281. Mack, supra note 16, at 120.
282. For a discussion of the deterioration of faith in the power of the juvenile court to
rehabilitate, see supra part II.B.2.
283. See, e.g., Senate Transcript, supra note 30, at 2. Senator Geo-Karis stated:
"People are getting fed up with youngsters ...getting by with murder, so to speak,
,cause [sic] they're underage." Id.; see also Currie, supra note 28, at C8 (stating that
"[miany young offenders today are hard-core criminals who have long arrest records for
serious crimes by the time they are eighteen. And most of them know that juvenile law
tips the scales of justice in their favor.").
284. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 24 (1967) (quoting the Supreme Court of Arizona).
285. See, e.g., Senate Transcript, supra note 30, at 4-5. In support of Illinois House
Bill 2696, Senator Petka commented:
There was a time when the protection of a juvenile, in my opinion, was a very
humane and very compassionate thing to do. We were dealing ...with
Halloween pranks, with vandalism, with joyriding, perhaps theft of motor
vehicles. We were ...as a matter of public policy ...shielding juvenile
offenders from their own emotional immaturity, their own mental immaturity,
in recognizing that certain things simply should not be done. What [HB 2696]
... targets [are] offenders who are not refugees from Father Flannigan's Boys
Camps. [W]e are targeting ... hardened incorrigible punks who are engaged in
violent activities ....
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ing violence that juveniles are committing today 286 has forced com-
munities to demand that the state be more concerned with protecting
the lives and safety of the public than it is with protecting the identities
of juvenile felons.
1. Providing Warning
Laws which provide for the disclosure of juvenile identities give
people of the communities that are plagued by juvenile crime two bene-
fits. The first benefit is warning. While it may not be in the immediate
interest of the delinquent, the interest of both victims and potential
victims alike in knowing who poses a threat to them are safeguarded
by such disclosure.287 The early reformers believed that juveniles
should not be punished by society's stigmas.288 They premised their
belief, however, on faith in their power to lead delinquents back to the
righteous path of civic living. 289 Today's alarming recidivism rates
among delinquents 29° make it difficult to imagine how disclosing the
identities of the most serious juvenile offenders could possibly reduce
their chances of becoming rehabilitated. With the prospects of rehabil-
itation resembling more of a chimera than reality, protecting juvenile
confidentiality accomplishes little for juveniles, and does nothing for
society except for concealing those who threaten public safety. 29' As
286. See, e.g., Andrew Gottesman, Critics Fear Disclosure Will Only Hurt Young
Criminals, CHI. TRIB., May 20, 1994, at Al (citing a 26.2% increase in the number of
juveniles arrested for murder from 1991 to 1992).
287. See, e.g., Senate Transcript, supra note 30, at 5. In supporting Illinois House
Bill 2696, Senator Petka asserted, "[The Bill permits] disclosure when it is in the best
interest of the community to know that information, and [in] the best interest of people
who are victims of crimes, to know that information." Id. An early positer of this
argument was J. Edgar Hoover, who, in 1957 wrote: "Local police and citizens have a
right to know the identities of the potential threats to public order within their
communities." Geis, supra note 150, at 120 (quoting J. Edgar Hoover).
288. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
290. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 145, at AlIl (citing a study of juvenile recidivism
in eight states conducted by the National Council on Crime and Delinquency which found
that 50%-70% of juveniles arrested were rearrested within twelve months); Herbert, supra
note 266, at E13 (citing a report stating that New York State's juvenile recidivism rate is
approaching 90%).
291. See ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS: CONCERNING A VERY OLD &
PAINFUL QUESTION 175 (1975) (quoting from an article in the New York Times):
"This is his fourth arrest," Detective Walker said, referring to the 14-year-old
boy whose name was withheld in, keeping with Family Court laws intended to
protect the youth. "All four cases were for assault and robbery only in two
cases the result was death."
"He didn't seem shook up," the detective said. "He knows he can only get 18
months. We can't cope with this court system. They're not giving them
enough time. There's no punishment."
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Ernest van den Haag points out:
There is little reason left for not holding juveniles responsible
under the same laws that apply to adults. The victim of a fifteen-
year-old muggers [sic] is as much mugged as the victim of a
twenty-year-old mugger, the victim of a fourteen-year-old
murderer or rapist is as dead or as raped as the victim of the
older one. The need for social defense or protection is the
same.
292  1
2. Asserting Morality
The second benefit communities derive from disclosing the identities
of juvenile felons is the opportunity to assert the need for morality by
placing punishing stigmas on those who commit immoral acts. 293 The
determinism that permeates the juvenile justice system forbids people
from attaching moral culpability to the juveniles who are committing
serious crimes.294 Morally healthy human beings experience a natural
and ineluctable sense of anger at the sight of crime.295 This anger fuels
Id.
292. Id. at 174.
293. For an illustrative discussion of the ways communities react to crime, see JAMES
Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 26-40 (First Vintage Books ed., 1985) (1975).
Predatory crime does not merely victimize individuals, it impedes and, in the
extreme case, prevents the formation and maintenance of community. By
disrupting the delicate nexus of ties, formal and informal, by which we are
linked with our neighbors, crime atomizes society and makes of its members
mere individual calculators estimating their own advantage, especially their
chances for survival amidst their fellows. Common undertakings become
difficult or impossible, except for those motivated by a shared desire for
protection. Coming together for protection may, of course, lead to a greater
sense of mutual aid and dependence and provide the basis for larger and more
positive commitments. It was out of a desire for self-defense, after all, that
many of the earliest human settlements arose. But then it was a banding
together against a common external enemy. Mutual protection against an
enemy within is more difficult to achieve, less sustaining of a general sense of
community, and more productive of conflict as disputes arise over who is the
victim and who the aggressor.
Id. at 26 (emphasis in original).
294. For a discussion of how determinism conflicts with the notion of moral
culpability, see supra part ll.A.l.b.
295. See, e.g., WALTER BERNS, FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: CRIME & THE MORALITY OF
THE DEATH PENALTY 145 (1979) (arguing that anger in response to the commission of
crime springs from our souls).
Criminals are properly the objects of anger, and the perpetrators of terrible
crimes-for example, Lee Harvey Oswald and James Earl Ray-are properly
the objects of great anger. They have done more than inflict an injury on an
isolated individual; they have violated the foundations of trust and friendship,
the necessary elements of a moral community, the only community worth
living in. A moral community, unlike a hive of bees or a hill of ants, is one
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their desire to see justice done." One of the primary functions of the
criminal justice system is to alleviate public anger by bringing about
justice.297 Public support for the criminal justice system, therefore, is
dependent on the belief that the courts are more effective at bringing
about justice than mob rule or vigilante justice, both of which are
examples of the dangers involved in excessive public anger.298 The
early reformers convinced society to exempt juveniles from moral
judgment, asking the public to replace its anger over juvenile crime
with compassion.2 99 This was not very difficult when juvenile crime
was rarely more serious than youthful pranks.3°° It has become much
whose members are expected freely to obey the laws and, unlike a tyranny, are
trusted to obey the laws. The criminal has violated that trust, and in so doing
has injured not merely his immediate victim but the community as such. He
has called into question the very possibility of that community by suggesting
that men cannot be trusted freely to respect the property, the person, and the
dignity of those with whom they are associated. If, then, men are not angry
when someone else is robbed, raped or murdered, the implication is that there
is no moral community because those men do not care for anyone other than
themselves. Anger is an expression of that caring, and society needs men who
care for each other, who share their pleasures and their pains, and do so for the
sake of the others. It is the passion that can cause us to act for reasons having
nothing. to do with selfish or mean calculation; indeed, when educated, it can
become a generous passion, the passion that protects the community or
country by demanding punishment for its enemies. It is the stuff from which
heroes are made.
Id. at 155. (footnotes omitted).
296. Id. at 152 (stating that "[a]nger is the passion that recognizes and cares about
justice").
297. Id. at 169.
[Tihe punishments imposed by the legal order remind us of the reign of the
moral order; not only do they remind us of it, but by enforcing its
prescriptions, they enhance the dignity of the legal order in the eyes of moral
men, in the eyes of those decent citizens who cry out 'for gods who will
avenge injustice.' Reenforcing the moral order is especially important in a
self-governing community, a community that gives laws to itself.
Id. (citations omitted).
298. Abraham Lincoln eloquently described the corrosive effects mob justice has on
public support for the laws:
[G]ood men, who love tranquility, who desire to abide by the laws, and enjoy
their benefits, who would gladly spill their blood in the defence of their
country; seeing their property destroyed; their families insulted, and their
lives endangered; their persons injured; and seeing nothing in prospect that
forebodes a change for the better; become tired of, and disgusted with, a
Government that offers them no protection ....
RICHARD N. CURRENT, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 15 (1967) (quoting
Lincoln's address before the Springfield Young Men's Lyceum).
299. See, e.g., Mack, supra note 16, at 120 (insisting that the juvenile court must
make the child "feel that he is the object of its [the state's] care and solicitude").
300. See, e.g., supra notes 284-85 and accompanying text.
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harder, however, because juveniles are now committing murder, rape,
armed robbery, and other serious crimes.3"' When someone inten-
tionally commits one of these crimes, angry calls for justice are not
only inevitable, they are appropriate.3 2
Disclosing the identities of delinquents who have committed serious
offenses gives society the opportunity to express its moral outrage
30 3
by placing stigmas on those who commit such acts.30 4 The early
reformers were mistaken in believing that the stigmas society attaches
are always unjust. Stigmas can be a sign of a morally healthy society
because they are expressions of what society values.30 5 If we value
equality, we will place stigmas on racists. If we value freedom, we
will place stigmas on tyrants. If we value the dignity of human life,
we will place stigmas on murderers, rapists and other serious crimi-
nals. A society without stigmas, therefore, would value nothing at
all.30 6
301. See Senate Transcript, supra note 283, at 2 (endorsing an Illinois bill which
rescinds the confidentiality of certain serious juvenile felons).
302. See, e.g., BERNS, supra note 295, at 145 (discussing how punishment satisfies
angry reactions to crime).
303. This Comment should not be mistaken as an endorsement of vigilante justice.
The expression of the community's moral outrage should never exceed the boundaries of
the law. See CURRENT, supra note 298, at 14-15 (stating that when private people take
the law into their own hands they destroy the public's attachment to the government and
its laws).
304. For a discussion on why it is important that communities attach such stigmas,
see WILSON, supra note 293, at 28:
When I speak of the concern for 'community,' I refer to a desire for the
observance of standards of right and seemly conduct in the public places in
which he lives and moves, those standards to be consistent with, and
supportive of, the values and life styles of the particular individual. Around
one's home, the places where one shops, and the corridors through which one
walks there is for each of us a public space wherein our sense of security, self-
esteem, and propriety is either reassured or jeopardized by the people and
events we encounter. Viewed this way, the concern for community is less the
'need' for 'belonging' (or, in equally vague language, the 'need' to overcome
feelings of 'alienation' or 'anomie') than the normal but not compulsive
interest of any rationally self-interested person in his and his family's
environment.
Id. (footnote omitted).
305. Because they are signs of what society values, stigmas, of course, can also
reveal moral sickness.
306. WILSON, supra note 293, at 253. Defending the practice of stigmatizing crime,
Wilson argues:
To destigmatize [sic] crime would be to lift from it the weight of moral
judgment and to make crime simply a particular occupation or avocation which
society has chosen to reward less (or perhaps more!) than other pursuits. If
there is no stigma attached to an activity, then society has no business
making it a crime . . . . The purpose of the criminal justice system is not to
392 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 27
Stigmas also enable society to perpetuate its values by discouraging
others from engaging in a disapproved activity.0 7 A common com-
plaint against the juvenile court system is that delinquents know that
their acts are not accompanied by serious consequences.3 8 Social
stigmas will not dissuade many current delinquents from breaking the
law, but they are important for forming the moral codes of law-abiding
youngsters.309 Stigmas dissuade crime by showing law-abiding citi-
zens that one of the unpleasant consequences of crime is incurring the
opprobrium of their communities. 3'0 The young need to see that en-
gaging in serious crime is more than a "youthful error" that is buried in
"the graveyard of the forgotten past.' 3 11 It is, rather, a serious mistake
with long-lasting consequences.312
expose would-be criminals to a lottery in which they either win or lose, but to
expose them in addition and more importantly to the solemn condemnation of
the community should they yield to temptation.
Id.
307. See, e.g., id.
308. See, e.g., Currie, supra note 28, at C8 (stating that juveniles know the scales of
justice weigh in their favor); Herbert, supra note 266, at E13 (stating that delinquents
know the juvenile court system is a joke).
309. See, e.g, WILSON, supra note 293, at 28-29 (describing the effects of a
community's standards on an individual).
Next to one's immediate and particular needs such things as shelter, income,
and education, one's social and physical surroundings have perhaps the
greatest consequence for oneself and one's family . . . . How he dresses, how
loudly or politely he speaks, how well he trims his lawn or paints his house,
the liberties he permits his children to enjoy-all those not only express what
the individual thinks is appropriate conduct, but in some degree influence what
his neighbors take to be appropriate conduct.
Id.
3 10. Id. at 253 (asserting that the criminal justice system should expose criminals to
the "solemn condemnation of the community").
311. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 24 (1967) (describing the justification that advocates of
juvenile confidentiality present for shielding delinquents from stigmas).
312. The story of Robert Sandifer, as told in Gibbs, supra note I, at 54, is a moving
example of a community using a tragedy to teach its children about the consequences of
crime. Eleven-year-old Robert Sandifer shot an automatic weapon into a crowd of
people, hoping to hit rival gang members, but instead he hit and killed fourteen-year-old
Shavon Davis, an innocent bystander. Id. at 56. Members of Sandifer's gang killed him
to prevent him from being caught and possibly informing the police about their
involvement in Shavon Davis's murder. Id. at 59. Although he was only eleven, Robert
Sandifer had 23 felony and 5 misdemeanor adjudications. Id. at 58. Several parents
brought their children to Robert Sandifer's funeral to show them the risk any criminal
takes. Id. at 54. The Reverend Willie James Campbell told the children at the ceremony,
"[C]ry if you will, but make up your mind that you will never let your life end like this."
Id.
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C. Legislating Juvenile Disclosure
The four general categories of state laws dealing with juvenile
confidentiality 3 3 effect differing levels of public notification.
1. Judicial Discretion
State laws that leave disclosure of juvenile records to the discretion
of judges 314 do little to protect or promote the interests of society. 3 5 A
recent National Law Journal survey of the nation's juvenile court
judges found that while eighty-five percent of the judges surveyed
believed that delinquency records should be disclosed to law enforce-
ment officials, seventy-one percent believed that those records should
not be disclosed to the public.316 It does not appear that conditioning
disclosure of delinquency records on judicial discretion results in much
public notification."'
2. Mandatory Disclosure to the Delinquent's School
The statutes in this category,33 8 which require juvenile courts to
release records to certain school officials, recognize the threats delin-
quents can pose to their teachers, their principals, and their classmates.
However, it is difficult to understand why, when acknowledging the
danger school administrators and classmates face when delinquents are
present, the state legislatures did not also recognize the danger to the
rest of society from these same delinquents. The closed and often
emotional surroundings of most schools render teachers and school
administrators who have disciplinary duties vulnerable to juvenile vio-
lence.31 9 It is difficult to say, however, that those who live in
313. See supra part 11I.C.1-4.
314. See supra part III.C.I.
3 15. Sherman, supra note 29, at Al.
316. Id.
317. The experience of the New Jersey state legislature provides further evidence of
judges' reluctance to disclose the identities of the delinquents that appear before them.
The New Jersey legislature passed a law that provided for the disclosure of most
delinquents, except for those delinquents whom juvenile judges believed faced a
"substantial likelihood that specific and extraordinary harm would result from such
disclosure in the specific case." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-60(f) (West Supp. 1994). The
legislature added the adjective "extraordinary" to modify the harm necessary to trigger an
exception to their disclosure provision. S.B. 897, 206th Legislature, State of New
Jersey (1994) (statement of Senator Kosco). Juvenile court judges throughout New
Jersey had been finding "specific harm" in nearly all of their cases. Id. Thus, the
juvenile judges disclosed the identities of only a handful of eligible delinquents. Id.
31 8. See supra part 1II.C.2.
319. See, e.g., Ronald D. Stephens, Gangs, Guns, & School Violence, USA TODAY,
Jan. 1994, at 29 (reporting how juvenile crime renders many our nation's schools very
dangerous places).
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communities plagued by juvenile crime are in a much safer position.
Furthermore, disclosing delinquency records to teachers and admin-
istrators, as the California law provides, 3 0 does not protect the juve-
nile from the stigmas the teachers and administrators may place on
their troubled students. The California law, therefore, does not protect
juveniles from the stigmas of those responsible. for their educations.
Opponents to disclosing juvenile records point out that society's stig-
mas can hinder a juvenile's chances of gaining employment.32 ' But
stigmas which potentially reduce chances to gain future employment
can do no more harm than stigmas which potentially reduce present
chances to receive an education. California has left itself very little rea-
son not to extend the protection of its disclosure law to cover all of
society.
3. Public Disclosure for Certain Serious Offenses
The third approach to disclosure of juvenile identities, used in
322Missouri, Illinois, and Louisiana, marks a significant withdrawal
from the parens patriae protection these states formerly extended to
their juvenile delinquents.323 This approach evinces the regrettable
conflict between those who emphasize the child's interests and those
who emphasize society's interests. Those who opposed the Illinois
law, for instance, argued in terms of what is in the best interest of the
child,324 while those in favor of it argued in terms of what is best for
the community.325 Missouri, Illinois, and Louisiana currently divide
their delinquents into two groups, those for whom they will continue
to exercise their powers as parens patriae, and those against whom
they will exercise their powers as protector of the community.
These laws do not go far enough. By listing certain specific felo-
nies which may result in public disclosure, Louisiana, Missouri, and
320. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE'§ 827 (b)(2) (West Supp. 1995), as amended by, S.B.
1092, 1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. 71 (West) (allowing the principal to disseminate the
information to any teacher or administrator "directly supervising or reporting on the
behavior progress of the minor").
32 1. See, e.g., Gottesman, supra note 286, at Al, AI I (disclosure of juvenile records
could shut juveniles out of school or work).
322. See supra part III.C.3.
323. Illinois, in fact, in 1899 became the first state to establish a juvenile court. In
re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14 (1967).
324. See, e.g., Gottesman, supra note 286, at AI I (quoting Al Pennacchio) (claiming
the new Illinois law tells juveniles they don't have a chance to turn their lives around).
325. See, e.g., Senate Transcript, supra note 30, at 5 (Senator Petka stated: "[Illinois
law permits] disclosure when it is in the best interests of the community to know that
information, and [in] the best interest of people who are victims of crimes, to know that
information.").
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Illinois open themselves up to charges that they unwisely exclude
some crimes and unfairly include others. In Illinois, for example, the
identity of a juvenile mugger who uses a knife is protected, while the
identity of a juvenile mugger who uses a gun is not.326 Illinois' mini-
mum age provision also exposes that state to criticism.32 The identity
of a twelve year old who takes part in an armed robbery is protected,
while the identities of any of his co-felons who are age thirteen or over
are not.328
If the purpose of denying the protection of confidentiality is to pro-
tect the community, then the law should apply to all those who pose a
serious threat to the community. Whenever juveniles commit felonies,
they become threats to society, and thereby forfeit any right to confi-
dentiality.329 Missouri, Illinois, and Louisiana should subject every
juvenile felon to public scrutiny. Society is just as threatened by, and
feels just as much righteous anger at, the juvenile felons who are not
covered by these disclosure laws. Juveniles who threaten someone
with a knife should experience the same public disapproval as those
who use guns. A crime committed by a gang member does no more
damage than the same crime committed by a lone assailant. Exposing
all juvenile felons to -automatic disclosure would further the efforts of
society to discourage all felonious activity and would notify the public
of all those juveniles who threaten its safety.
4. Disclosure of Most or All Juvenile Felons
States in this final category go the furthest in ensuring disclosure of
juvenile felons. 330 These states have recognized that society will no
longer tolerate juvenile felons who go unpunished by societal stigmas.
By disclosing juvenile felons' identities, these states provide warning
to the community and assert morality, two primary benefits of this
policy. 33'
D. The Inevitability of Disclosure
In 1982, Robert Belair, writing a report for the United States
Department of Justice, predicted the burden proponents of preserving
326. The Illinois law covers all felonies that involve use of a gun, but not a knife. Id.
327. Thirteen is the minimum age for potential disclosure. Id.
328. Id.
329. BELAIR, supra note 49, at 18 (paraphrasing Juvenile Judge James J. Delaney of
Brighton, Colorado). "[A] juvenile who commits a crime forfeits his rights of privacy.
in just the same way that adult offenders forfeit their right of privacy." Id.
330. See supra part III.C.4.
331. See supra part IV.B.I-2.
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juvenile confidentiality would have to meet over the next decade:
Because confidentiality in our society is seldom justifiable as an
end in itself, proponents of juvenile justice confidentiality will
be called upon to demonstrate that the degree of confidentiality
now enjoyed by juvenile offenders is warranted; presumably
because confidentiality fosters rehabilitation and because efforts
at rehabilitation are desirable and realistic. 332
A resurgence in the doctrine of personal responsibility has made
efforts at rehabilitation undesirable.3 33 The frequency and severity of
today's juvenile violence make efforts at rehabilitation unrealistic.334
These two factors combine to make the burden for proponents of juve-
nile confidentiality insurmountable.
Mr. Belair continued his prophetic paragraph by predicting, with
laudable foresight, what would happen if proponents for juvenile con-
fidentiality did not meet the above burden:
In the absence of such a demonstration, it is likely that juvenile
justice records, or at least those that pertain to "older" juveniles,
will eventually be subject to the same confidentiality standards
that apply to adult criminal record information. In any event,
proponents of juvenile justice confidentiality should expect that
over the course of the next decade, policymakers will take a
careful and skeptical look at the purpose, practicability and
effect of confidentiality in juvenile justice ... records.335
Both Kansas and Colorado currently treat the records of juvenile
felons as if they were the records of adult felons.336 States like
Louisiana, Missouri, Illinois, New Jersey, and Idaho are approaching
this practice.337
It appears inevitable that most states will enact laws similar to those
in Kansas and Colorado, thereby disclosing the records of all juvenile
felons above a certain age. Proponents of juvenile confidentiality are
not able to defend successfully (on either philosophical or practical
grounds) the continuation of the practice of shielding delinquents from
society's stigmas. There is nothing in America's present political or
philosophical landscape to suggest that the American public will be
more receptive to the practice or philosophy behind juvenile confidenti-
ality in the near future.
332. BELAIR, supra note 49, at 26.
333. See supra part IV.A.
334. See supra part IV.B.
335. BELAIR, supra note 49, at 26.
336. See supra notes 241-44 and accompanying text.
337. See supra notes 226-29, 237-40 and accompanying text.
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E. Prediction
The failures of the juvenile justice system may ultimately lead to the
complete abandonment of the promise of rehabilitation and the rise of a
new system of juvenile justice based on punishment, where a defen-
dant's age is considered only in sentencing. If the problem of juvenile
delinquency continues to worsen, the state may be left with no choice
but to punish those whom it cannot rehabilitate. This will, at best,
alleviate only some of the problem. A system that promises punish-
ment rather than rehabilitation may keep some juvenile offenders off
the streets longer, and may even serve as a greater deterrent to those
youths considering criminal activity. But the causes of the rise in
juvenile crime, like those of the rise in adult crime, are too complex to
be resolved by any judicial system.
V. PROPOSAL
The practice of preserving juvenile confidentiality, one of the last
vestiges of the paternalism that flowed from the state's role of parens
patriae, is dissolving. Society will no longer allow those youth who
engage in serious crime to escape accountability.338  States like
Missouri, Illinois, Louisiana, New Jersey, Idaho, Kansas, and
Colorado have passed laws which establish the rule that committing
certain crimes is an effective forfeiture of a juvenile's right to confi-
dentiality.339 Society's desire for juvenile accountability, coupled with
the precedent set by these laws, may lead to states drawing more lines
in the sand, which will further rescind the special treatment afforded
juvenile offenders. 340 This Part proposes a general direction for the
movement to reform the nation's juvenile justice systems, and sug-
gests a specific approach to the issue of juvenile anonymity.
A. Recognize the Philosophical Shift and Reform Accordingly
Alexis de Tocqueville observed that: "[Once] an opinion has taken
root in a democracy and established itself in the minds of the majority,
it afterward persists by itself, needing no effort to maintain it since no
one attacks it."'34' The public accepted deterministic premises culmi-
nating in the assertion that delinquents can be rehabilitated, even
338. See Kfoury, supra note 21, at 67 (stating that "[s]ociety requires accountability.
Juveniles must be accountable indeed to the court, but more importantly, in the larger
sense, to society").
339. See supra notes 226-29, 233-44, and accompanying text.
340. See Sherman, supra note 29, at Al (quoting Ira M. Schwartz) (hypothesizing
that states could legislate their juvenile courts out of existence by 1999).
341. DETOCQUEVILLE, supra note 70, at 643.
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though there was never a convincing amount of evidence to support
this proposition.342 Eventually, the price became too high, as juveniles
became increasingly violent.343 Consequently, the juvenile justice
system lost public support because it has failed to protect society from
the juveniles it cannot rehabilitate."
For several years the deterministic assertions of thejuvenile justice
system benefited from an inertia of favorable public opinion.345
Today, however, determinism is frequently seen as a source of
excuses rather than legitimate etiologies.346  By rejecting the deter-
minist assertion that no action is of moral consequence because no
action is truly voluntary,341 society appears to yearn for something
approaching an Aristotelian construct of ethics in which the only
actions that are excused from moral relevance are those :few which are
completely beyond the control of the actor.34
Any reform of the juvenile justice system must recognize the shift
back to traditional ethics if it is to receive public support. Such
reforms should aspire to expose juveniles to the moral consequence of
their crimes. This does not mean that we should return to the practice
of locking small children in with adult criminals.349 It does mean,
however, that every crime committed by a juvenile should be punished
in one form or another, including incarceration for the worst juvenile
offenders. As Attorney General Janet Reno recently remarked: "It is
imperative for serious juvenile offenders to know they will face a
sanction .... Too many of them don't understand what punishment
342. See supra part II.B.2.
343. See supra notes 274-78 and accompanying text.
344. See supra notes 274-78 and accompanying text (discussing the rise in juvenile
violence and public support for disclosure).
345. See, e.g., Robert M. Hutchins, Fonvard to, PURSUING JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD, Vii-
viii (Margaret Rosenheim ed., 1976) (describing the favorable image that his
contemporaries held of the juvenile justice system); W. VAUGHAN STAPLETON & LEE. E.
TEITELBAUM, IN DEFENSE OF YOUTH: A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF COUNSEL IN AMERICAN
JUVENILE COURTS, 23 (1972) (noting that the juvenile justice system did not receive
public criticism for the first fifty years of its existence).
346. See supra part IV.A.I.
347. For a more thorough exposition of the determinist theory, see Blanshard, supra
note 83, at 3-15.
348. In THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Aristotle writes that those who commit
involuntary acts deserve pardon, and sometimes even pity. See ARISTOTLE, supra note
65, at 964. Aristotle's parochial definition of an involuntary act, however, excludes
acts that are not the product of pure compulsion or blameless ignorance. Id. at 966. The
agent's ignorance cannot be in any way the fault of the agent and the agent must feel
pain and regret when he learns the consequences of his actions. Id.
349. This was one of the practices against which the juvenile justice reform
movement was aimed. See Mack, supra note 16, at 106.
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means because they have been raised in a world with no understanding
of reward and punishment. ' ' 350 The juvenile justice system that failed
to punish Robert Sandifer for the twenty three felonies he committed
before he was killed made him feel he was untouchable.3 5 His tragic
life and the callous way he took the life of Shavon White are the pre-
dictable results of living in a world excluded from the rewards and
punishments that comprise the expectations of morality. 352
B. Disclose the Identities of All Felonious Juveniles
Experiencing the disapproval of the community he victimizes should
be part of the punishment for every juvenile felon. Every state, there-
fore, should adopt legislation similar to Colorado's, which simply dis-
closes the records of every juvenile who is "adjudicated delinquent on
the basis of committing an act which would constitute a felony if com-
mitted by an adult. 3 53 There are two reasons why such an approach is
important: (1) it serves the good of the child's community, and (2) it
serves the good of the child himself.
1. Disclosure is Good for the Community
When a juvenile commits a felony he renders himself a threat to the
peace and security of his community. It is in the best interest of the
community to disclose the identities of those who threaten it. Aside
from allowing communities to protect themselves from those who are
likely to disturb their peace and security, disclosure allows communi-
ties to exercise their moral sense by attaching stigmas to those who act
in inappropriate ways.354 The moral health of each community de-
pends upon its ability to express its disapproval of those who threaten
it. 355
2. Disclosure is Good For the Child
The early reformers of the juvenile justice system erroneously be-
lieved that society's moral sense was its enemy instead of its friend.356
350. Lacayo, supra note 9, at 61.
351. Gibbs, supra note 1, at 58.
352. For an interesting discussion of what happens to children when they are
shielded from morality, see MATZA, supra note 18, at 189 (suggesting that such children
commit crimes, in part, because they wish to rejoin the moral order by forcing adults to
punish them for what they have done).
353. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §19-1-119 (1)(b.5) (West Supp. 1995).
354. See supra part IV.B.l-2.
355. See, e.g., BERNS, supra note 295, at 155 (describing the importance of allowing
communities to express their moral anger at crime).
356. See, e.g., Mack, supra note 16, at 109 (insisting that children must be shielded
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As a result, they did everything they could to exclude juveniles from
the moral order that operates in the rest of society.357 They failed to
appreciate the fact that the disapproval of a delinquent's community is
a powerful instrument of moral reform.35 Juvenile felons should not
believe, as Robert Sandifer did,359 that they are beyond the reach of
their communities' moral condemnation.
VI. CONCLUSION
The juvenile justice system was designed to rehabilitate "bad
boys '' 36° who had made "youthful errors, 36 1 which could be forgotten
in the name of the best interest of the child. But an increasing number
of today's "bad boys" are committing crimes which society cannot,
and should not, forget.362 Missouri, Illinois, Louisiana, New Jersey,
Idaho, Kansas, and Colorado have laws that have taken significant
steps toward recognition of the fact that, when dealing with juvenile
felons, the juvenile court system fails to rehabilitate and succeeds only
in putting the rest of society at risk. Other states should follow suit
and introduce accountability into the juvenile justice system.
ARTHUR R. BLUM
from society's stigmas).
357. Id.
358. See WILSON, supra note 293, at 29 (describing the power the opinions of one's
community can have over individual action).
359. See supra note I and accompanying text.
360. Mack, supra note 16, at 107.
361. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 24 (1967).
362. See, e.g., supra part IV.A.2.
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